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 1  Introduction 
  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a novel auction form to assign licenses for 
the next generation of wireless communication services. Up for auction were thousands of Personal 
Communication Services (PCS) licenses (and other licenses), each covering exclusive rights for a 
particular slice of the radio spectrum over a geographic area. These licenses, once developed by firms, 
promise to expand and improve wireless services and increase competition throughout 
telecommunications. 
  The licenses were assigned using a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This auction form was 
proposed by auction experts Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson of Stanford University and Preston McAfee 
at the University of Texas. A simultaneous multiple-round auction is similar to a traditional ascending-bid 
“English” auction, except that, rather than selling each license in sequence, large sets of related licenses 
are auctioned simultaneously. In every round, a bidder can bid on any of the licenses being offered. The 
auction does not close until bidding has ceased on all licenses; that is, until a round goes by in which there 
are no new bids on any of the licenses. 
  There are three critical features of this method. First, the ascending-bid design allows the bidders to 
react to information revealed in prior rounds. This reduces the winner's curse, enabling the bidders to bid 
more aggressively (Milgrom and Weber 1982). Second, by auctioning a large set of related licenses 
simultaneously, bidders are able to react to prices across licenses. Since bidder valuations depend on the 
collection of licenses held, providing this price information on related licenses is essential to the formation 
of efficient aggregations of licenses. Some licenses are complements, whereas others are substitutes. The 
simultaneous sale of related licenses in an ascending bid auction, gives the bidders the flexibility they need 
to express these value interdependencies. In addition, it assures that similar licenses sell for similar prices. 
Third, keeping the bidding on all licenses open until there are no new bids gives the bidders flexibility in 
switching among license aggregations as prices change. 
  This paper looks at the first four PCS auctions and two auctions of other licenses to assess the 
auction's performance in practice. In evaluating the auction design, it should be recognized that efficiency 
was the primary goal of the FCC, not revenue maximization. The FCC sought to assign the licenses in a 
timely manner to those firms that will put the licenses to their best use. Fortunately for taxpayers, the 
goals of efficiency and revenue maximization often coincide. High prices are consistent with an efficient 
auction, since only bidders with high values are willing to pay high prices. This assumes that the high 
values are coming from a firm's advantage at providing better services at lower prices, rather than an 
advantage in restricting market competition. To reduce the chance that high values are derived from more 
collusive industry structures, the FCC limits the amount of spectrum a firm can hold in any market. 
Moreover, governments should care about the revenues raised at auction, since auction revenues are less 
distortionary than the principal source of government revenues — taxation. Ballard, et al. (1985) estimate 
that the welfare loss from increasing taxes is in the range of 17 to 56 cents per dollar of extra revenue 
raised. Hence, in designing the auction, the government should be willing to accept some assignment 
inefficiency if the gain in revenues is sufficiently large.
1 
  I find strong evidence that the auction design was successful. The bidding process revealed a great 
                                                                                                                                       
     
1See Ayres and Cramton (1996) for an analysis on the revenue enhancing effects of bidding credits and 
installment payments for small bidders in the Regional Narrowband auction. See Rothkopf and Harstad 
(1990) and Rothkopf, et al. (1996) for a more general analysis.  
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deal of information about likely assignments and relative prices. Bidders were able to react to this 
information, shifting bids to alternative licenses. The information allowed arbitrage across similar licenses, 
so prices on similar licenses were close. Finally, the information revealed in the bidding enabled firms to 
piece together complementary licenses into efficient aggregations. 
  In order to test and refine the auction design, the FCC wisely chose to begin with the simplest of the 
auctions: the auction of ten nationwide narrowband PCS licenses. Narrowband licenses are used to provide 
advanced paging and data services. Because of the narrow bandwidth, they are ill-suited for commercial 
real-time voice services, like cellular. Cellular services require broadband licenses, which have up to 600 
times the bandwidth (30 MHz vs. 50 kHz). Although the nationwide auction is the largest narrowband 
auction in terms of spectrum offered, it involves the smallest number of licenses and no geographic 
aggregation issues. However, a bidder can acquire up to three narrowband licenses in any area, so quantity 
aggregation is an issue. The nationwide auction lasted 47 rounds over five days in July 1994. In the end, 
the government collected $617 million for the ten licenses. Competition was intense and bidding was 
aggressive throughout the auction. Cramton (1995) provides a detailed analysis of the nationwide auction 
from a bidder's perspective. 
  Next on the block were thirty regional narrowband licenses. Six licenses were sold in each of five 
regions. Thus, geographic aggregations would play a role, but would be much less complicated than in 
later auctions, which split the nation into smaller geographic areas, Major Trading Areas (MTAs) or Basic 
Trading Areas (BTAs). Despite a more rapid start, the auction, conducted in October and November 1994, 
took 105 rounds to complete. The government raised $395 million. Most of the licenses were sold as 
nationwide aggregations. Prices were 12.4% higher than in the earlier nationwide auction. In addition, 
women and minorities won all ten licenses on which they were given a 40% bidding credit. However, 
competition among the women and minority bidders effectively eliminated the credit: prices were 40% 
higher on licenses receiving the credit than equivalent licenses without the credit. 
  These first two auctions were testing grounds for the third and most important spectrum auction, the 
MTA broadband PCS auction, which began on December 5, 1994 and ended March 13, 1995, after 112 
rounds. This was the largest public auction ever. 99 MTA licenses were offered — two 30 MHz licenses 
in each of 51 MTAs, with the exception of New York, Los Angeles, and Washington in which one of the 
two licenses in each market was awarded as a Pioneer's Preference (a reward to firms introducing 
pioneering technologies). Behavior in this auction differed markedly from the narrowband auctions. In 
particular, the bidding was much more cautious. Bids were mostly at or near the minimum level and a 
bidder's activity in any round was at or near the minimum activity required to maintain its eligibility. 
Nonetheless, the auction raised over $7 billion ($7.7 billion including the Pioneer licenses). 
  In the second broadband auction, the third 30 MHz of spectrum (the C-block) was auctioned as 493 
BTA licenses. This auction was for small bidders only. Competition was intense and prices were high — 
more than double those in the first auction. Attractive payment terms accounted for some of the difference, 
but differences in competition were also important. The auction raised $10.2 billion in 184 rounds of 
bidding. 
  The final two auctions were for licenses that were heavily encumbered. The licenses up for sale were 
like Swiss cheese. Substantial holes existed where the FCC had previously awarded antenna-based 
licenses. The first was for Multipoint Distribution Services (MDS), commonly called "wireless cable," 
since the service is a wireless substitute for standard cable TV. The second, specialized mobile radio 
(SMR), is used for various wireless applications, such as taxi cab dispatching. Both auctions were 
competitive. Not surprisingly, incumbents where often successful in acquiring the residual areas of 
encumbered licenses and usually at a favorable price.  
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  I begin by outlining the design issues. Then I discuss the auction rules (section 3). In section 4, I 
summarize the experience from the narrowband auctions. Sections 5 and 6 discuss bidding behavior in the 
MTA and BTA broadband auctions. Section 7 discusses the MDS and SMR auctions. Section 8 assesses 
the success of the auction design. The reader should be forewarned: this is a descriptive paper about the 
spectrum auctions. My claims are based only loosely on theory and empirical analysis. Much work 
remains to be done. 
  2 Auction Design 
  The design of the PCS spectrum auctions was the result of a rule making process carried out by the 
FCC from August 1993 to March 1994. Dozens of companies and their auction experts commented on the 
auction rules in an open public debate. Below I summarize several of the important issues. Although 
spectrum auction design is discussed elsewhere (McMillan 1994, Milgrom 1995, and Chakravorti et al., 
1995), I review the issues here, since understanding the issues will be helpful in assessing the spectrum 
auctions. 
  2.1 Open Bidding is Better than a Single Sealed Bid 
  An essential advantage of open bidding is that the bidding process reveals information about 
valuations. This information promotes the efficient assignment of licenses, since bidders can condition 
their bids on more information. Moreover, to the extent that bidder values are affiliated, it raises auction 
revenues (Milgrom and Weber 1982), since the winner's curse is reduced. Bidders are able to bid more 
aggressively in an open auction, since they have better information about the item's value. 
  The advantage of a sealed-bid design is that it is less susceptible to collusion (Milgrom 1987). Open 
bidding allows bidders to signal through their bids and establish tacit agreements. With open bidding, these 
tacit agreements can be enforced, since a bidder can immediately punish another that has deviated from the 
collusive agreement. Signaling and punishments are not possible with a single sealed bid. 
  A second advantage of sealed bidding is that it may yield higher revenues when there are large ex 
ante differences among the bidders (Maskin and Riley 1995). This is especially the case if the bidders are 
risk averse (Maskin and Riley 1984, Matthews 1983). In a sealed bid auction, a strong bidder can 
guarantee victory only by placing a very high bid. In an open auction, the strong bidder never needs to bid 
higher than the second-highest value. 
  There was a consensus among experts (many of whom were employed by potential bidders) in favor 
of open bidding. The advantage of revealing more information in the bidding process was thought to 
outweigh any increased risk of collusion. Collusion was viewed as unlikely and revenue maximization was 
a secondary goal. 
  2.2 Simultaneous Open Bidding is Better than Sequential Auctions 
  A frequent source of debate was whether licenses should be sold in sequence or simultaneously. A 
disadvantage of sequential auctions is that they limit information available to bidders and limit how the 
bidders can respond to information. With sequential auctions, bidders must guess what prices will be in 
future auctions when determining bids in the current auction. Incorrect guesses may result in an inefficient 
assignment when license values are interdependent. A sequential auction also eliminates many strategies. 
A bidder cannot switch back to an earlier license if prices go too high in a later auction. Bidders are likely 
to regret having purchased early at high prices, or not having purchased early at low prices. The  
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guesswork about future auction outcomes makes strategies in sequential auctions complex. 
  In a simultaneous auction, a large collection of related licenses is up for auction at the same time. 
Hence, the bidders get information about prices on all the licenses as the auction proceeds. Bidders can 
switch among licenses based on this information. Hence, there is less of a need to anticipate where prices 
are likely to go. Moreover, the auction generates market prices. Similar items sell for similar prices. 
Bidders do not regret having bought too early or too late. 
  The 1981 sale of rights to use an RCA communication satellite illustrates the practical importance of 
generating similar prices for similar licenses (McAfee and McMillan 1996). Seven identical licenses were 
sold in a sequence of ascending bid auctions. Prices ranged from $14.4 million for the first license 
auctioned to $10.7 million for the sixth. The bidder with the $14.4 million winning bid petitioned the FCC 
to throw out the auction, because the auction procedure violated common carrier nondiscrimination rules. 
The FCC agreed and required RCA to charge the same price to all bidders. 
  Proponents of sequential auctions argue that the relevant information for the bidders is the final prices 
and assignments. They argue that simultaneous auctions do not reveal final outcomes until the auction is 
over. In contrast, the sequential auction gives final information about prices and assignments for all prior 
auctions. This final information may be more useful to bidders than the preliminary information revealed 
in a simultaneous auction. 
  Supporters of sequential auctions also point out that the great flexibility of a simultaneous auction 
makes it more susceptible to collusive strategies. Since nothing is assigned until the end in a simultaneous 
auction, bidders can punish aggressive bidding by raising the bids on those licenses desired by the 
aggressive bidder. In a sequential auction, collusion is more difficult. A bidder that is supposed to win a 
later license at a low price is vulnerable to competition from another that won an earlier license at a low 
price. The early winner no longer has an incentive to hold back in the later auctions. 
  A final advantage of a sequential auction is that it has been used extensively in practice and is easier 
to implement than a simultaneous auction. A sequence of oral auctions can be done quickly with little risk 
of failure. Adopting an unproven design, like the simultaneous auction, exposes the FCC to political 
embarrassment should the auction fail. 
  In the end, the advantages of simultaneous auctions won out. Decision makers at the FCC were 
convinced that the virtues of the simultaneous auction — greater information release and greater bidder 
flexibility in responding to information — would improve efficiency. Although the FCC was concerned 
that a simultaneous auction might be more collusive, it felt that the setting was otherwise not conducive to 
collusion. In any event, sequential auctions would not eliminate the possibility for collusion. 
  The ability to successfully implement a novel auction form was a chief concern. However, the FCC 
was able to test and refine the simultaneous auction in the simpler and lower stake setting of narrowband 
licenses. In addition, experimental tests of the design were conducted before the first narrowband auction 
began. Tests were conducted at CalTech's experimental lab by Charles Plott, David Porter, and John 
Ledyard. Several large bidders conducted their own tests as well. These tests provided evidence that the 
design would work in practice. 
  2.3 Package Bids are too Complex 
  A bidder's value of a license may depend on what other licenses it wins. Philadelphia may be worth 
more to a bidder if it wins the adjacent licenses in New York and Washington. Hence, bidders may value 
being able to bid on a combination of licenses, rather than having to place a number of individual bids.  
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With a package bid, the bidder either gets the entire combination or nothing. There is no possibility that 
the bidder will end up winning just some of what it needs. 
  With individual bids, bidding for a synergistic combination is risky. The bidder may fail to acquire 
key pieces of the desired combination, but pay prices based on the synergistic gain. Alternatively, the 
bidder may be forced to bid beyond its valuation in order to secure the synergies and reduce its loss from 
being stuck with the dogs. This is the exposure problem. Individual bidding exposes bidders seeking 
synergistic combinations to aggregation risk. 
  Not allowing package bids can create inefficiencies. For example, suppose there are two bidders for 
two adjacent parking spaces. One bidder with a car and a trailer requires both spaces. She values the two 
spots together at $100 and a single spot is worth nothing; the spots are perfect complements. The second 
bidder has a car, but no trailer. Either spot is worth $75, as is the combination; the spots are perfect 
substitutes. Note that the efficient outcome is for the first bidder to get both spots for a social gain of $100, 
rather than $75 if the second bidder gets a spot. Yet any attempt by the first bidder to win the spaces is 
foolhardy. The first bidder would have to pay at least $150 for the spaces, since the second bidder will bid 
up to $75 for either one. Alternatively, if the first bidder drops out early, she will “win” one license, 
losing an amount equal to her highest bid. The only equilibrium is for the second bidder to win a single 
spot by placing the minimum bid. The outcome is inefficient, and fails to generate revenue. In contrast if 
package bids are allowed, then the outcome is efficient. The first bidder wins both licenses with a bid of 
$75 for both spots. 
  The inefficiency in this example does not rely on there being full information about values. If values 
are privately known, then the first bidder will decide to bid for the pair only if it is sufficiently likely that 
the second bidder has a low value. Otherwise the exposure is too great and the first bidder will not 
participate. 
  This example is extreme to illustrate the exposure problem. The inefficiency involves large bidder-
specific complementarities and a lack of competition. In the PCS auctions, the complementarities are less 
extreme and the competition is greater. 
  Unfortunately, allowing package bids creates other problems. Package bids may favor bidders 
seeking large aggregations due to a variant of the free-rider problem, called the threshold problem 
(Bykowsky, et al. 1995). Continuing with the last example, suppose that there is a third bidder who values 
either spot at $40. Then the efficient outcome is for the individual bidders to win both spots for a social 
gain of 75 + 40 = $115. But this outcome may not occur when values are privately known. Suppose that 
the second and third bidders have placed individual bids of $35 on the two licenses, but these bids are 
topped by a package bid of $90 from the first bidder. Each bidder hopes that the other will bid higher to 
top the package bid. The second bidder has an incentive to understate his willingness to push the bidding 
higher. He may refrain from bidding, counting on the third bidder to break the threshold of $90. Since the 
third bidder cannot come through, the auction ends with the first bidder winning both spaces for $90. 
  A second problem with allowing package bids is complexity. If all combinations are allowed, even 
identifying the revenue maximizing assignment is an intractable integer programming problem when there 
are many bidders and licenses. The problem can be made tractable by restricting the set of allowable 
combinations (Rothkopf, et al. 1995). However, these restrictions may eliminate many desirable 
combinations, especially in broadband PCS where cellular holdings and other existing infrastructure tend 
to create idiosyncratic license synergies. Alternatively, a bid mechanism can be used that puts the 
computational burden on the bidders. In the AUSM system, bidders must propose bids that in combination 
with other bids exceed the amount bid for standing package bids (Banks, et al. 1989).  
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  Increased complexity is a legitimate concern when considering package bids. Although simultaneous 
auctions with package bids were successfully used in the laboratory (Bykowsky, et al. 1995), it was far 
from certain that the FCC could successfully run auctions with package bids under the tight time schedule. 
Furthermore, allowing package bids would weaken a central advantage of auctions: transparency. A bidder 
who offered a higher bid for part of a combination might be unable to see why it lost. 
  The FCC decided against allowing package bids. The threshold problem and increased complexity of 
package bids were thought to be worse than the exposure problem. 
  2.4 Other Issues 
  Having settled on a simultaneous ascending-bid auction without package bids, several issues of 
implementation remained. 
  How much information should the bidders be given? The insights from Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
suggest that typically more public information is better. Hence, with the exception of bidder identities in 
the nationwide auction, the FCC decided to reveal all information: the identities of the bidders, all the 
bids, and the bidders' current eligibility. So long as collusion and predatory bidding are not problems, 
revealing more information should improve efficiency and increase revenues. It also makes for a more 
open process. 
  Should the rounds be discrete or continuous? The FCC decided on discrete rounds, which would give 
the bidders a specific amount of time to respond to bids. Continuous bidding has the advantage that it 
makes endogenous the time between bids. Bidders can respond quickly when the strategic situation is 
simple, and take more time when it is complex. Discrete bidding is easier to implement and it gives the 
bidders a specific schedule to follow. Bidders know exactly when new information will be available and 
when they have to respond. 
  How can the FCC best control the pace of the auction? There are three key instruments: the 
frequency of rounds, the minimum bid increments, and an activity rule, which sets minimum levels of 
bidding activity. These are discussed later. 
  3 Auction Rules 
  The basic rules for the auctions are the same. A group of licenses with strong value interdependencies 
are up for auction at one time. A bidder can bid on any collection of licenses in any round, subject to an 
activity rule which determines the bidder's current eligibility. The auction ends when a round passes with 
no new bids on any license. This auction form was thought to give the bidders the greatest flexibility in 
expressing values and building license aggregations. An auction winner gains the exclusive right to use the 
spectrum in accordance with FCC rules for a period of ten years. Licenses typically are renewed with a 
negligible charge provided the licensee has adhered to FCC rules and met buildout requirements. 
Licensees at any time may resell licenses purchased without special preference. Resale of licenses 
purchased with special preference is restricted to prevent “unjust enrichment.” 
  Within this basic structure, some of the details differ among the auctions. Here I mostly focus on the 
MTA broadband rules. Detailed auction rules for the narrowband auctions are given in the FCC's Third 
Report and Order (1994); the rules for the broadband auctions are given in the Fifth Report and Order 
(1994). Refinements were made in subsequent public notices and orders on reconsideration. 
 Quantity  Restrictions. To promote competition, a firm is limited in the quantity of spectrum it can  
 
 
  7 
hold in any market. For narrowband spectrum, a firm can hold no more than three licenses in any market. 
For broadband auctions, firms can hold no more than 45 MHz of commercial mobile radio service 
(CMRS) spectrum in any area. PCS and cellular are classified as CMRS spectrum. Hence, a cellular 
incumbent (a 25 MHz license) is ineligible to bid for a 30 MHz license in its service area. This assures 
that each 30 MHz license in every market will be held by distinct firms, independent of the two cellular 
incumbents. 
 Designated  Entities. To encourage broad participation in wireless communications, designated firms 
(women, minorities, and/or small businesses) were given bidding credits on specific licenses. These 
credits, ranging from 10% to 40%, were intended to offset any disadvantage these firms faced in raising 
capital and providing services. Designated firms often were eligible for attractive installment payment 
plans also. No preferences were given in the MTA broadband auction. However, in the C-block auction, 
only entrepreneurs (annual revenues less than $125 million) and small businesses (annual revenues less 
than $40 million) were eligible to bid. 
 Payment  Rules. Payments are received by the FCC at three times: (1) An upfront payment before 
the bidding begins assures that the bidder is serious. Any withdrawal penalties are taken from the bidder's 
upfront payment.
2 (2) A down payment of 20 percent is paid within five business days after the close of 
the auction. (3) A final payment of the remaining 80 percent is paid within five business days of the award 
of the license. Firms eligible for installment payments have a reduced down payment and make quarterly 
payments over 10 years. Licenses are awarded one to three months after the auction. 
  The upfront payment, due two weeks before the auction begins, defines the bidder's maximum 
eligibility in any round of bidding. Each bidder must make an upfront payment of $.02 per MHz-pop for 
the largest combination of licenses the bidder intends to be active on in any round. The size of a PCS 
license is measured in MHz-pop: the bandwidth in megahertz times the population in the license area. A 
bidder is active on a license if it places a valid bid or was the high bidder on the license in the prior round. 
Thus, an upfront payment of $6 million in the broadband auction would make a bidder eligible to be active 
on licenses covering 6/(30⋅.02) = 10 million people. The upfront payment is not license specific; it simply 
limits total bidding activity in any round. 
  Minimum Bid Increments. To assure that the auction concludes in a reasonable amount of time, the 
FCC specifies minimum bid increments between rounds. Initially, bid increments are set at the greater of 
5% or $.02/MHz-pop. Before a license receives a bid, the minimum bid is 0. Bid increments are adjusted 
in response to bidder behavior. In the early rounds, when bid activity is high, the FCC sets larger bid 
increments; in the later rounds, when bid activity is low, the FCC sets smaller bid increments. 
 Activity  Rule. The activity rule is a further device for controlling the pace of the auction. It forces a 
bidder to maintain a minimum level of activity to preserve its current eligibility. As the auction progresses, 
the required activity increases in stages. There are three stages in the activity rule proposed by Paul 
Milgrom and Robert Wilson. In the initial stage each bidder must be active on at least one-third of its 
current eligibility. Activity is measured as the sum of the MHz-pops on which the bidder submitted a valid 
                                                                                                                                       
     
2The importance of significant upfront payments is illustrated by the Interactive Video Data Services 
(IVDS) auction, held on July 27-28, 1994. This auction was marred by several defaults. Upfront payments 
were only $500 per license for licenses valued in excess of one million dollars. Defaults occurred on 114 
of 574 licenses. The defaults came from a handful of speculators that apparently did not understanding the 
rules or the technology before the auction. A large upfront payment, which serves as a deposit to ensure 
payment of a penalty in the event of default, provides an incentive for bidders to be well-prepared.  
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bid or was the high bidder. If activity falls below the one-third level, then the bidder's current eligibility is 
reduced to three times its current activity. In stage 2, a bidder must be active on at least two-thirds of its 
current eligibility. If its activity falls below the two-third level, the bidder's current eligibility is reduced to 
1.5 times its current activity. In stage 3 of the auction, a bidder must be active on 100 percent of its 
current eligibility. If its activity falls below 100 percent, the bidder's current eligibility is reduced to its 
current activity. 
  A waiver prevents a reduction in eligibility in the event of bidder error or some other problem. 
Bidders are given five waivers. (In the regional auction each bidder was given one waiver per stage.) 
Waivers are applied automatically. An automatic waiver is used whenever a bidder's eligibility would 
otherwise fall as a result of its reduced bid activity. A bidder that does not wish to maintain its eligibility 
from the prior round may override the automatic waiver. 
  Number of Rounds per Day. A final means of controlling the pace of the auction is the number of 
rounds per day. In the narrowband auctions, many rounds were conducted each day. This made sense 
given the relatively small number of licenses and more modest stakes. The time between rounds was 
longer early in the auction (about 2 hours), but shortened toward the end when bidding activity was low 
and strategies were simple. At the end of the nationwide auction, rounds were occurring every 20 minutes. 
In the MTA auction, the number of rounds per day was much less. Initially only one round was conducted 
per day. After the first week, typically two rounds were conducted each day. 
 Stopping  Rule. A simultaneous stopping rule is used to give the bidders maximum flexibility in 
pursuing backup strategies. All markets close if a single round passes in which no new bids are submitted 
on any license. In the MTA auction, the FCC retained the right to keep the auction open if there were no 
new bids in a round. This prevents a premature close of the auction at the end of stages 1 and 2 if bidders 
simply are bidding to maintain eligibility. It also allows the FCC to use a larger bid increment. If the 
increment chokes off activity, then the FCC can drop the increment and/or move to the next stage in order 
to restore bid activity. 
 Bid  Information.
3 Each bidder is fully informed about the identities of the bidders, the size of the 
upfront payments, and which bidders qualify as designated entities. High bids and bidder identities are 
posted after each round. In addition, all valid bids and bidder identities are displayed at the conclusion of 
each round, together with each bidder's eligibility and waivers.
4 
 Bid  Withdrawal. After the close of each round, there is a brief withdrawal period in which the high 
bidders can withdraw their bids subject to a bid withdrawal penalty. If a bidder withdraws its high bid, the 
FCC is listed as the high bidder and the minimum bid is the second-highest bid for that license. The 
second-highest bidder is in no way responsible for the bid. If no firm bids on the license, the FCC can 
reduce the minimum bid. Typically, the FCC drops the minimum bid only one or two times, before 
committing not to reduce the minimum bid further. A withdrawn high bid counts as bidding activity for 
                                                                                                                                       
     
3Readers can obtain the bidding data for all of the auctions by anonymous ftp at ftp.fcc.gov. For the 
last four auctions, tracking tools created by the author are also available. These tools enable the user to 
analyze the bidding data within a spreadsheet environment. See the FCC's Web site at www.fcc.gov. 
     
4In the nationwide auction, bidder identities were not disclosed. It was thought that concealing 
identities might reduce the chance of predatory bidding (bidding to raise rivals' costs) and collusion. 
However, concealing identities was largely unsuccessful, and predatory bidding and collusion were not 
problems (Cramton 1995); hence, the decision to reveal identities in subsequent auctions.  
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the high bidder in the round the bid is withdrawn. This enables the bidder to switch licenses without losing 
eligibility. 
  To discourage insincere bidding, there are penalties for withdrawing a high bid. The penalty is the 
larger of 0 and the difference between the withdrawn bid and the final sale price. This penalty is consistent 
with the standard remedy for breach of contract. The penalty equals the damage suffered by the FCC as a 
result of the withdrawal. If the bidder defaults or is disqualified after the close of the auction, the penalty 
is increased by 3% of the eventual sale price to compensate the FCC for additional selling costs. The 
additional 3% default payment is also intended to discourage defaults (after the auction closes) relative to 
withdrawals (during an auction). 
  4 The Narrowband Experience 
  The nationwide and regional narrowband auctions served two important roles. First, the auctions 
assigned narrowband spectrum, allowing winning firms to begin offering advanced paging services. 
Second, they provided an opportunity to test and refine the rules for the all important MTA broadband 
auction. In this section, I summarize the bidding behavior in the narrowband auctions and its implication 
for the broadband auction. 
  4.1 Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction 
  Up for auction were ten nationwide licenses in three different types: 50/50 kHz paired licenses 
(50/50s), 50/12.5 kHz paired licenses (50/12s), and 50 kHz unpaired licenses (50s). With the “paired” 
licenses, the first number denotes the amount of outbound capacity (from network to consumer) and the 
second number denotes the amount of inbound capacity (from consumer to network). An unpaired license 
consists of only outbound capacity. Inbound bands are not the same as outbound bands, because of 
differing power constraints. Hence, one 50/50 kHz paired license is not the same as two 50 kHz unpaired 
licenses. There are five 50/50s (blocks 1 to 5), three 50/12s (blocks 6 to 8), and three 50s (blocks 9 to 11). 
License 9 was not up for auction because it had been set aside for Mtel as a Pioneer's Preference award. 
Women and minorities were given a 25% bidding credit on one license of each type (blocks 5, 8, and 11). 
  The auction began July 25, 1994 and concluded July 29, after 47 rounds. Of the 29 bidders that 
submitted upfront payments, four bidders failed to show up at the auction. Eight more bidders dropped out 
in the first round, leaving 17 bidders competing for the 10 licenses. In the end, licenses were won by six 
firms, as shown in Table 1. Price is stated in $/MHz-pop (i.e., the cost of the license in dollars divided by 
the product of the size of the license in megahertz and the population covered, which is 253 million for a 
nationwide license). This makes prices among license types comparable. One remarkable aspect of the 
outcome is that the final prices for all the licenses were nearly equal at about $3.10 per MHz-pop. Within 
a license type, prices were nearly identical. 
  Bidders were able to form efficient aggregations. Those winning multiple licenses (PageNet and 
McCaw) acquired adjacent bands. Owning adjacent bands increases the firm's capacity, since it can use 
the guard band, which separates adjacent bands, for transmission. Otherwise, the guard band must be clear 
to prevent interference between adjacent bands. 
  Figure 1 displays the auction revenue and a measure of bid activity (the percent of new bids) in each 
round. Revenues increased rapidly early in the auction when bid activity was high. As prices increased, 
bid activity declined as did the rate of increase in revenues. Bidding was aggressive throughout the 
auction. Indeed, minimum bid increments proved unimportant. Bidders routinely bid well in excess of the  
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minimum. The activity rule also played no role. The auction never left stage 1. The FCC felt the auction 
was progressing sufficiently quickly, so that stage 2 was not needed. 
  None of the three licenses with the designated entity (DE) bidding credit were won by designated 
entities. A 25% bidding credit was insufficient to attract sufficient DE capital to win a license. One 
explanation is that the designated entities were surprised by and unprepared for the high prices. Indeed, 
most of the DEs dropped out in the first round of the auction. 
  There was a tendency for the bidding to move down from the larger licenses (50/50s and 50/12s) and 
then to the smaller licenses (50s). Through the first 18 rounds, bidding was primarily on the 50/50s and 
50/12s. After round 19, bidding stopped for 7 rounds on the 50/50s, but then resumed again in round 26, 
before concluding in round 37. Bidding on the 50/12s was heavy throughout the first half of the auction, 
but concluded in round 25, 21 rounds before the end of the auction. Bidding on the 50s was light and 
steady throughout the auction. The last 9 rounds of the auction involved new bids on only the 50s. In the 
final eight rounds, there was just a single new bid in each round — three bidders were competing for two 
licenses. 
  Jump bidding — the act of raising a high bid by much more than the minimum increment — was 
pervasive throughout the auction. 49% of all new high bids were jump bids that exceeded the high bid by 
more than two bid increments. 23% of these jump bids were raises of one's own high bid (bidders 
anticipating a raise by a rival). Even in the opening round, with minimum bids between $250,000 and 
$500,000, bidding started at $20 million on two licenses and $10 million on five others. The $20 million 
opening exceeded the minimum bid by a factor of 40. This behavior seems to fly in the face of common 
bidding wisdom. However, there may be good reasons for jump bidding, especially in an auction where 
the aggregation of licenses plays a role. The basic idea is that the jump bid may convey information about 
a bidder's valuations. It is a message of strength, conveying that the bidder has a high value for the 
particular license. Jump bidding has a cost — it exposes the bidder to the possibility of leaving money on 
the table. It is precisely this cost that makes the communication credible. A bidder with a low value would 
not find it in its interest to make a large jump. The gain, increasing the chance of winning the license, 
would not exceed the cost, the risk of overbidding. It is not enough for a bidder to simply announce, “I 
have a high value. You had better look elsewhere.” All bidders, high value and low value alike, have an 
interest in making such a statement. To make the statement credible the words must be backed up by an 
action that a low value bidder would find too costly. 
  Signaling a high value is a good thing for a bidder to the extent it gets rivals to look elsewhere. This 
may be the case if there are strong synergies among licenses. A bidder's confidence about the chance it 
can form a desirable aggregation should fall if it is convinced a rival has a high value. However, the cost 
of staying in may be zero for a bidder looking for a single license. For the most part, jump bidding 
appeared not to discourage firms from bidding. Avery (1994) provides an equilibrium analysis of jump 
bidding in a common value setting. 
  The simultaneous multiple-round auction was remarkably successful in this first PCS auction. 
Competition was intense, similar items sold for similar prices, and aggregations appeared efficient. 
Interestingly, the bid increments and activity rules proved unimportant. Firms bid aggressively and were 
rarely constrained by bid increments or activity rules. 
  4.2 Regional Narrowband PCS Auction 
  This auction was of special interest, because it used rules that were nearly identical to the rules in the 
MTA broadband PCS auction. Although these rules were used in the nationwide auction, the nationwide  
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auction did not allow the possibility for forming geographic aggregations. In the regional auction, the 
formation of geographic license aggregations was critical. Hence, the regional auction gave us a first 
glimpse of bidding behavior designed to form large geographic aggregations.
5 
  The regional narrowband PCS auction began on October 26, 1994, and ended on November 8, after 
105 rounds. Initially, there were 28 bidders competing for the 30 regional licenses. Six bands (two 50/50s 
and four 50/12s) were offered in each of five regions. In the end, nine firms won licenses. Table 2 
indicates the final outcome. Prices ended 12.4% above the prices in the nationwide auction. Most of these 
regional licenses went to firms with a nationwide strategy (PageMart, PCS Development, Mobile Media, 
Advanced Wireless, and AirTouch). Figure 2 tracks the progress of the auction round by round. After the 
first six rounds, it was a much slower auction than the nationwide auction. 
  The first round of the auction set the stage for an early escalation in prices. PCS Development opened 
with bids totalling $80 million ($48 million net of the DE credit) for a nationwide aggregation of 50/50s, 
matching the final price from the nationwide auction. Clearly the information revealed in the nationwide 
auction played a role in the regional auction. PageMart opened with two nationwide bids of $32 million on 
the 50/50s, as well as two nationwide bids on the 50/12s. Mobile Media opened with three nationwide bids 
of $20 million each on a 50/50 and two 50/12s. Most of the other bidders were more cautious. Forming a 
nationwide aggregation clearly was important for several bidders. 
  By round 7, the assignment of licenses was quite close to the final assignment reached nearly 100 
rounds later. PageMart, PCS Development, Mobile Media, and Advanced Wireless each had staked out a 
nationwide aggregation on blocks 1 to 4, respectively. AirTouch apparently wanted licenses in three 
regions. The biggest disagreement was on the 50/12 DE block. Both Shearing and Benbow were fighting 
for a nationwide aggregation. Prices increased by about 40% over the final 96 rounds on bidding activity 
sparked by the excess demand of DE bidders. As in the nationwide auction, predictions of a rapid end of 
the regional auction proved false. The long end is partly explained by the greater number of licenses and 
substitution possibilities, and partly by the use of a 2% bid increment after round 20, rather than 5%. 
However, since many rounds were conducted each day, the use of this smaller increment extended the 
auction less than one week. 
  Unlike in the nationwide auction, the regional auction involved three stages of bidding. Stage 2 began 
in round 21 (a bidder must be active on two-thirds of its current eligibility). Since most bidders were 
bidding aggressively in stage 1, the move to stage 2 had little effect. There was a modest increase in 
activity for a few rounds. Stage 3 began in round 74 (a bidder must be active on 90% of its current 
eligibility). Bidding activity picked up slightly. Mostly this was caused by 50/12 bidders keeping the 50/50 
option open by bidding on two 50/12s, rather than one. 
  Also unlike in the nationwide auction, bid withdrawals were observed in the regional auction. In 
round 78, PCS Development withdrew its bid of $18 million on block 6 in the Western region. The final 
selling price was $18.2 million, so no penalty was incurred. The withdrawal was the result of strategic 
bidding, not a shift in license aggregations. PCS Development's bid on block 6 was an attempt to punish 
Shearing for repeated bidding on block 2, which PCS Development wanted as a nationwide aggregation. 
The only other withdrawal occurred in round 83 when PageMart withdraw its bid of $10.129 million on 
block 5 in the Southern region and shifted to blocks 3 and 4. The final selling price was $8 million, so 
PageMart incurred a withdrawal penalty of $2.129 million. This withdrawal also was due to strategic 
bidding. PageMart needed to bid on two 50/12s to maintain eligibility so that it could return to the 50/50 
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license in block 2 if prices on the 50/12s increased too much. Apparently PageMart reasoned that it was 
better to bid against the nationwide aggregations of Mobile Media (block 3) and Advanced Wireless (block 
4). Winning these licenses would mean success in breaking up two nationwide competitors. At worst, the 
bids would raise the costs of PageMart's nationwide competitors and enable a move up to the 50/50. 
Perhaps PageMart thought that someone might be willing to pick up the 50/12 on block 5 at the 
withdrawal price. However, it was too late in the auction. The block 5 50/12 was not picked up until the 
FCC dropped the minimum price to $8 million (from $9.93 million). At this price InstaCheck was willing 
to move off the Northeast license, ending the auction. 
  A remarkable feature of the regional auction was the role designated entity bidders played in 
determining prices. All DE licenses were sold to DEs. Of the 28 bidders, 20 had some kind of DE 
preference. Nearly one-half of the upfront payments came from DE bidders. Competition among the DEs 
was so intense that the 40% bidding credit was entirely bid away. DE bidders paid roughly the same net 
prices as non-DE bidders. The effective DE discount on block 2 was 1.8% and the discount on block 6 
was -2.2%. 
  This was in stark contrast to the outcome in the nationwide auction in which the DEs dropped out 
early, most after the first round of bidding. The difference in outcome was largely due to changes in the 
DE rules. Although the increase in the bidding credit from 25% to 40% was the most obvious change, it 
probably was unimportant. Either credit would have kept non-DE bidders out of the DE licenses. Hence, 
it was competition among DEs that determined prices on the DE licenses, rather than competition between 
DE and non-DE bidders. Two other changes were critical. First, allowing installment payments for DE 
bidders at attractive terms (10-year Treasury rate) solved one of the major problems DEs face — the 
raising of capital. Second, the definition of women and minority controlled firms was relaxed. In the 
nationwide auction, 50.1% equity ownership by women/minorities was required. In the regional auction, 
25% equity ownership was sufficient as long as the women/minorities had voting control and no other 
investor owned more than 25%. This made it easier for DE firms to partner with existing paging 
companies, which solves the second major problem facing DE bidders: acquisition of technical knowledge. 
Each of the bidders winning DE licenses partnered with one or more established paging companies. PCS 
Development partnered with A-Plus, Arch, and USA Mobile; Benbow partnered with Westlink; and 
Shearing partnered with Adelphia. These partnerships brought essential knowledge in addition to capital to 
the DE firms. As a result, these DE bidders did not look much different from the non-DEs. A third 
important factor in the success of the DEs was that much of the uncertainty about prices was resolved in 
the nationwide auction. DE bidders had the time and the knowledge to adequately prepare for the regional 
auction. 
  One of the puzzles in the regional auction was that prices were 12.4% higher than in the nationwide 
auction. Evidence from wine auctions suggests that, when similar items are sold in sequence, the later 
items tend to sell for less than the early items. This is known as the “declining price anomaly” 
(Ashenfelter 1989, McAfee and Vincent 1993).
6 One explanation for the rise in prices is the more 
favorable DE rules. These rules, which were not known at the time of the nationwide auction, brought 
more capital to the auction and effectively reduced the supply of non-DE licenses. This reduction in supply 
raised prices for the non-DE bidders. Moreover, competition among DE bidders was so strong that the DE 
bidders crossed over to the non-DE licenses, raising the revenues from non-DE licenses by more than $50 
                                                                                                                                       
     
6There are exceptions to declining prices. Gandal (1995) finds that prices tended to increase in the 
sequential sale of Israeli cable television licenses. Apparently firms were willing to pay more for later 
licenses, because of complementarities.  
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million (Ayres and Cramton 1996). The favorable treatment of DE bidders had the effect of increasing 
auction revenues. Such a conclusion is consistent with auction theory. When bidders are asymmetric ex 
ante, the revenue maximizing auction will tend to favor the weak bidders (Myerson 1981, McAfee and 
McMillan 1987). By favoring the weaker party, the weaker party can compete more effectively with the 
strong firms. This heightened competition tends to raise prices. 
  An alternative explanation for the higher prices in the regional auction is that competition was greater 
because of the presence of several bidders with regional strategies. However, since most regional licenses 
were sold as nationwide aggregations, many of the winning firms in the regional auction could have 
purchased in the nationwide auction, reducing prices in the regional auction. 
  Another explanation for the higher prices in the regional auction is that, because of the obvious 
interest in single-band nationwide aggregations, firms were able to impose costs on competitors by bidding 
on a piece of a competitor's nationwide aggregation. There is some evidence of such predatory bidding. 
  The regional auction made clear that it is possible for firms to form large aggregations in a 
simultaneous multiple-round auction. Moreover, it showed that the nationwide prices were no fluke and 
that DE preferences could have pronounced effects on competition and outcomes. Although the activity 
rule continued to be of little importance in this auction, low bid increments did lengthen the end of the 
auction. 
  5 MTA Broadband PCS Auction 
  On December 5, 1994, the first and most important broadband PCS auction began. One-half of the 
120 MHz of broadband spectrum was on the block: two 30 MHz licenses (bands A and B) in each of 51 
MTAs, less the three Pioneer's Preference awards (the A license in New York, Los Angeles, and 
Washington). The 51 MTAs range in size from New York with 26.4 million people to American Samoa 
with 47 thousand people. The ten largest MTAs cover 50% of the population. The two narrowband 
auctions, allocating just 1.2 MHz of spectrum, were small compared to the 60 MHz allocated in the MTA 
broadband auction. Competing in the auction were some of the largest telecommunication companies in the 
world, as well as many smaller firms. There were no benefits to designated entities. Benefits to DEs 
would come in later auctions when the remaining 60 MHz of spectrum is sold. The auction ended on 
March 13, 1995 after 112 rounds and three months of bidding. The government collected over $7 billion 
($7.7 billion including the Pioneer payments).
7 
  5.1 The Rush for Alliances 
  To be eligible to bid, a bidder had to submit a Short Form Application by October 28, 1994. The 
Short Form specified all alliances and listed the licenses on which the firm wished to bid. All partnering 
had to occur by October 28. The FCC allowed alliances, because they might be essential to efficiency. For 
example, a nationwide service might be efficient, due to marketing advantages, but no individual firm may 
have the resources to bid for one. On the other hand, alliances may reduce efficiency by limiting 
competition in the auction. During the two weeks before the deadline, there was a frenzy of activity in 
                                                                                                                                       
     
7The Pioneer's Preference winners pay for their licenses according to a formula in the GATT 
legislation. Each pays the greater of $7.50/pop or 85% of the unweighted per pop price in the top-23 
markets excluding New York, Los Angeles, and Washington. The formula was included as an amendment 
to GATT to make the legislation revenue neutral.  
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forming alliances. The largest telecommunication companies in the world were engaged in a last-minute 
dance to form alliances that would shape the future of PCS and have far reaching implications throughout 
telecommunications.
8 
  In the end, two large alliances formed: WirelessCo, a limited partnership between Sprint (40%) and 
three large cable companies: TCI (30%), Comcast (15%), and Cox (15%); and PCS PrimeCo, a collection 
of three Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) (Bell Atlantic, Nynex, and USWest) and AirTouch, the 
wireless spinoff of PacTel. The four companies in PrimeCo first got together as pairs: USWest-AirTouch 
and Bell Atlantic-Nynex. Each firm has a 25% stake in PrimeCo. The alliance was in part prompted by a 
desire by the Bell Atlantic-Nynex pair to secure Los Angeles. There appeared to be a consensus in the 
industry that PacTel would win the only available license in Los Angeles. Cox held the other as a 
Pioneer's Preference award, and was already aligned with WirelessCo. Hence, Bell Atlantic-Nynex 
apparently felt that their best way to get coverage in Los Angeles was to partner with either PacTel or 
USWest-AirTouch. AirTouch held one of the two cellular licenses in Los Angeles. 
  These alliances were significant because they greatly reduced eligibility. Since bidders could not bid 
in any market in which they hold a significant cellular interest, joining forces with a large cellular provider 
reduced eligibility. Firms had a double incentive to join. First, merger would enable the firms to serve a 
larger geographic area, perhaps near-nationwide, which has many advantages for marketing. Consumers 
value seamless roaming and national advertising campaigns then can be used. Second, merger reduces the 
number of bidders and the bidders' eligibility. Any merger that includes the marginal bidder (the bidder 
with the third-highest value) reduces the price paid. 
  The WirelessCo merger likely increased competition by combining complementary assets: long 
distance, national marketing, and local cable networks. Neither Sprint, nor the cable companies, were well 
positioned to go it alone, but together they represented a strong force. Moreover, since none of the firms 
had sizeable cellular holdings, the alliance made WirelessCo ineligible to bid on only 17% of the 
population. 
  In contrast, the PrimeCo alliance reduced competition in the auction. The BOCs and AirTouch all had 
sufficient capital to form substantial aggregations independently. By joining forces, the number of deep-
pocketed bidders was reduced as was total eligibility. PrimeCo was excluded from bidding on 64% of the 
population as a result of the cellular holdings of its members. Hence, the alliance eliminated three deep-
pocketed bidders in nearly two-thirds of the U.S. and turned four bidders into one in the remaining third. 
  Finally, AT&T's acquisition of McCaw Cellular for $11.5 billion meant that AT&T would be 
ineligible to bid on licenses covering 48% of the population. 
  Although 62 bidders submitted short form applications for the auction, only 30 followed through with 
upfront payments. The upfront payments totalled $522 million. The largest ($118 million for 197 million 
pops of eligibility) was from WirelessCo. Four firms put up the minimum upfront payment of $28 
thousand, enough to bid on American Samoa. 
  One consequence of the two major alliances was a reduction in total eligibility. This auction began 
with an eligibility ratio (total eligibility in pops divided by total pops being auctioned) of 1.93. The 
                                                                                                                                       
     
8Bidders were allowed to form alliances during the auction, but only with bidders applying for a 
disjoint set of licenses. This option was not used by any of the bidders. It only works with bidders with 
very focused interests - those applying for only a few licenses. But bidders with focused interests have 
little to gain by forming alliances with bidders outside their interests.  
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eligibility ratios in the narrowband auctions were several times this amount. The eligibility ratio in the 
nationwide auction was 8.8 and was 6.1 in the regional auction. Some potential bidders with limited 
capital probably were scared off by the thought of bidding against the likes of AT&T and PrimeCo. At 
least one bidder, Craig McCaw, bidding as Alaacr Communications, recognized that prices might be low 
in some markets. McCaw reasoned that there were few large bidders and in many markets two or more of 
the largest firms were excluded from bidding because of cellular ownerships. Hence, McCaw decided at 
the last moment to participate. In deference to his former employees at McCaw Cellular (now part of 
AT&T), McCaw applied for every license that AT&T did not apply for. 
  Three of the firms, WirelessCo, AT&T, and PrimeCo, went into the auction with a nationwide 
strategy. Each firm wanted to fill the holes in its cellular network. Other firms had focused geographic 
interests. PacTel, for example, announced its intent to win Los Angeles and San Francisco, although it 
applied for all licenses. Ameritech was only interested in two midwest licenses. GTE was interested in a 
handful of licenses that would work well with its existing network. Several firms applied for just a single 
license, making a clear statement about their intent. In contrast, McCaw was looking for value wherever it 
might be. 
  One of the major differences between this auction and the narrowband auctions was the extent of ex 
ante asymmetries among the firms. Values in broadband PCS are closely related to the network 
infrastructure the firm already has in place. This geographic heterogeneity together with the much smaller 
geographic markets means that in many instances the firms have a good idea who the high valuers are 
likely to be in many markets. PacTel has high values in Los Angeles and San Francisco; Ameritech has 
high values in Cleveland and Indianapolis; AT&T has high values in Washington and Chicago; PrimeCo 
has high values in Chicago and Dallas. If the known differences are large, it is possible that at least in 
some markets, the assignment will be resolved without using price to drive away bidders with lower 
values. If all the bidders know that PacTel has the highest value in Los Angeles, there is less incentive for 
a bidder to bid against PacTel in Los Angeles. The bidder may succeed only in driving prices higher. The 
smaller geographic licenses make the possibility of tacitly dividing up the licenses a greater possibility. 
Not only can the pie be divided along dimensions of perceived value, but punishments can be directed at 
defectors. For example, PacTel is easily punished for bidding outside of California. A bidder simply tops 
PacTel's high bid in Los Angeles. Still such tacit collusion is upset by a few value-seeking bidders with 
deep pockets that do not have clearly specified geographic interests. They have little reason to cooperate 
and are difficult to punish. However, bidding by these value-seeking bidders may be limited by budget 
constraints and a lack of existing infrastructure. 
  5.2 Bidding Behavior 
  Bidding behavior in the MTA auction was dramatically different from that in the narrowband 
auctions. The bidding was consistently restrained and cautious. Bids were rarely much above the minimum 
level. Jump bids, rather than being the norm, were the exception. Throughout stages 1 and 2, activity by 
most firms was near the minimum necessary to maintain eligibility. These differences are displayed in 
Figure 3, which shows the revenue and bidding activity by round. Revenue, rather than being a nice 
concave function exhibiting diminishing changes in revenue with each round, is a series of three hills each 
defined by the auction stages. The first 30 rounds of stage 2 and the first 16 rounds of stage 3 show no 
tendency for diminishing changes in revenue. Bidding activity in the narrowband auctions followed a 
pattern of steady exponential decay as bidders dropped out of the auction or cut back demand. In sharp 
contrast, broadband bidding activity was a sequence of three bursts in activity at the beginning of a stage 
followed by decay. The decay in stage 1 was especially dramatic. All major bidders held back, simply  
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bidding to maintain eligibility. By round 10, activity had fallen to a single bid in Detroit.
9 
  Activity was restored to above 30% with the movement to stage 2 in round 12. Firms were forced to 
bid or reduce eligibility. Activity was so steady in the next 18 rounds that in round 31 the FCC raised the 
bid increment from 5% to 10%. Over the next 20 rounds activity steadily declined until leveling out at 
about 7% in round 51. A drop in the bid increment in round 60 from 10% to 5% failed to stimulate 
activity. Hence, in round 65, stage 3 began. Again bidding activity jumped back to over 30%. Steady 
bidding by AT&T and especially WirelessCo kept revenues increasing throughout the early rounds of stage 
3. 
  Of the $7 billion raised during the auction, 12.5% was raised in stage 1, 51.8% was raised in stage 2, 
and 35.6% was raised in stage 3. Despite the importance of stage 3, it is not the case that the earlier 
rounds served little purpose. Shifts in the allocation of licenses from the end of stage 2 were limited. On 
licenses covering 76% of the population, the high bidder at the end of stage 2 won a license in the market. 
Hence, much of the sorting was accomplished in stage 2. 
  5.3 Why so Cautious? 
  There are several explanations for the absence of aggressive bidding in the broadband auction. First, 
the lower eligibility ratio and the possibility of tacit collusion suggested to firms that prices might be low 
in certain markets. The matching might occur at low prices. A cautious, patient bidder might save tens of 
millions by limiting demands early on. Second, because of the high stakes, broadband bidders were more 
constrained in their behavior. More elaborate control structures were in place and more individuals were 
involved in the bidding decisions. The narrowband bidders were relatively small, entrepreneurial 
companies operating in a highly competitive paging industry. In contrast, the MTA broadband bidders 
were mostly giant telecommunications companies operating in regulated monopolies or a duopoly cellular 
industry. One would guess that conservative strategies would be more apt to carry the day in such an 
environment. Third, the incentives for signaling through large jump bids were much less in the broadband 
auction. PacTel, for example, would gain nothing by jump bidding in Los Angeles. Everyone knows that 
PacTel had a strong interest in Los Angeles. A jump bid would add little to this belief. In contrast, the 
jump bids in the narrowband auctions played a role in sorting out the assignments. 
  Many auction experts were more surprised by the aggressive narrowband behavior than the 
conservative broadband behavior. There are good reasons for laying back and letting the other firms push 
prices up. This is precisely why the auction design includes minimum bid increments and activity rules 
that assure that the auction will move at an acceptable pace. By hiding in the grass, a bidder lets others 
reveal information, preserves the possibility of tacit collusion, and reduces the possibility of a bidding 
frenzy. 
  5.4 Final Results 
  Table  3 shows the final outcome of the MTA auction. For each market, the table gives the 
population, the round in which the final bids were placed, the winning firms, the marginal bidder (i.e., the 
last bidder to drop out), and the bids and the prices ($/pop).
10 Most of the licenses did not receive final 
                                                                                                                                       
     
9The auction would not have closed if no new bids were received. The FCC would have moved to 
stage 2 immediately. 
     
10In the MTA auction, prices are measured in $/pop, rather than $/MHz-pop, since both bands are the  
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bids until late in the auction. Even by the end of stage 2, only 19% of the licenses had final bids. 
  Prices varied a great deal across markets, but varied little within markets. The similarity of prices 
within a market is clear. The licenses are near-perfect substitutes and the auction design allows bidders to 
shift between licenses as prices change. Across markets there is no reason to expect similar prices. 
Chicago, the most expensive market at $31.90 per pop, and Guam, the cheapest at $0.61 per pop, differ in 
important ways. Revenues on a per pop basis depend on several factors which vary by market, such as 
anticipated population growth, income, and cellular use. More importantly, the cost of providing service 
differs substantially across markets. Buildout costs are much less in densely populated markets that are 
relatively flat. Chicago is flat and has most of its population concentrated in a small subset of the MTA. 
Buildout costs are low and the market commands a high price. In contrast, Charlotte ($7.27 per pop) has 
its population spread throughout a large MTA with hilly terrain. Buildout costs are also low in MTAs like 
Denver and Salt Lake City where most of the population is in relatively flat areas and coverage can be 
provided from surrounding mountains. 
  Buildout costs on average are expected to be at least double the license fees (Salant 1995). Hence, any 
variation in buildout costs will be magnified in the license fee. Suppose a typical market has a license fee 
of about $15 per pop and a buildout cost of $30 per pop for a total cost of $45. If a particular market's 
buildout cost is 50% above the norm ($45 not $30), then the market would require a license fee of $0 to 
maintain the $45 per pop cost. Variation in buildout costs was such that some firms assigned negative 
values to developing markets with high buildout costs. 
  Table 4 shows the final outcome by bidder. The bidders are sorted from most to least important in 
determining prices, where importance is measured by the population coverage of markets in which the 
bidder either won or was marginal (the last to drop out). 18 of the 30 bidders succeeded in winning 
licenses. WirelessCo and AT&T were the two most aggressive bidders. Between them they won 58% of 
the available spectrum. 87.3% of the spectrum was won by the major local and long distance telephone 
companies. Most of the remainder was won by three other companies: American Portable (a subsidiary of 
TDS), Western, and Powertel (a large electric utility). 
  There is a strong correlation between the size of the upfront payment and the amount of spectrum 
won by a bidder. This association is present in all six auctions. When we regress percent spectrum won 
with percent upfront payment, we find that the upfront payment is a critical determinant of how much 
spectrum is ultimately won. The correlation between the upfront payment and the percentage winnings is 
78% in the nationwide auction, 83% in the regional auction, 93% in the MTA auction, and 64% in the C-
block auction. Some of the correlation in the MTA auction is an artifact of the low total eligibility. Some 
firms with large upfront payments had to win a large share of the licenses. But the correlation is much 
stronger than required. A bidder with a large percentage upfront payment tended to win an even larger 
percent of the spectrum. Bidders with small upfront payments tended to win nothing. 
  The 30 bidders can be split into three broad categories: national bidders, value-seeking bidders, and 
regional bidders. Table 5 lists the bidders by type and perceived financial strength. For each bidder, the 
table gives the bidder's influence on price (measured by the total population coverage of the markets in 
which the bidder either won or was marginal), and a brief description of the bidder's apparent strategy. 
Most of the bidders had simple strategies, which I term “sincere.” They bid on a specific set of markets 
until prices got too high and then reduced demand. Other bidders, such as GTE, adopted a wait and see 
strategy, avoiding markets of primary interest until later in the auction (Salant 1995). Still others, such as 
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WirelessCo, had complex strategies in which moves into markets were timed to take advantage of the 
activity rule. 
  5.5 Craig McCaw 
  A notable absence in the list of winners is Craig McCaw, bidding as Alaacr. Although McCaw did 
not win any licenses, he played an important role in several key markets. McCaw apparently recognized 
that in some markets there might not be enough deep-pocketed bidders for prices to reach full value. By 
putting down just $33 million in earnest money, McCaw gained eligibility to bid in many large markets. 
At almost no cost (the lost interest on the $33 million upfront payment), McCaw was buying the option to 
step in and snatch licenses that were underpriced because of a lack of competition. He was an 
opportunistic bidder, who in the end did not find any opportunities. 
  To estimate the effect of McCaw's presence, we can look at those markets in which McCaw was the 
marginal bidder (the last to drop out). One estimate of McCaw's effect on price is the difference between 
the high bid and the next highest bid without McCaw. In the five markets where McCaw was the marginal 
bidder, this difference totals $825 million (or $829 when one includes the effect on pioneer revenues). 
Most of this difference comes from two markets: New York where GTE dropped out at $150 million and 
Los Angeles where no one else ever bid against PacTel. Due to under bidding, this may overstate 
McCaw's effect on revenues. For example, even though McCaw was the only bidder to compete with 
PacTel in Los Angeles, someone else may have stepped in if McCaw was not there. The question is how 
high another bidder would be willing to go. Los Angeles and New York were too large for the smaller 
bidders. GTE was the only realistic competitor in these markets. But GTE had little to gain and much to 
lose by pushing up the prices in Los Angeles and New York. 
  McCaw's presence was important not only to raise revenue for the government, but also in reducing 
the possibility of successful tacit collusion. If several markets are going for low prices because of too few 
deep-pocketed bidders, then the incentive for bidding on other licenses is reduced. A bidder holding an 
undervalued license is more apt to limit its bidding, because of the possibility that additional bidding will 
trigger competition for the undervalued license. 
  Some commentators suggested that Craig McCaw, the largest individual shareholder of AT&T with a 
1% stake, was simply bidding with AT&T's interests in mind. McCaw could raise rivals' costs and 
facilitate tacit collusion by punishing bidders in markets in which AT&T was ineligible to bid. McCaw's 
behavior appears inconsistent with this hypothesis. McCaw's bidding in under-priced markets tended to 
upset tacit collusion, contrary to AT&T's interest. Furthermore, by pushing prices higher in the non-
AT&T markets, McCaw caused some bidders to switch to AT&T markets, increasing competition and 
prices in these markets. In all likelihood, AT&T would have been better off with McCaw absent. 
  Further evidence of McCaw's interest in PCS comes from his subsequent investment in Nextel, which 
offers an alternative to PCS. It seems that McCaw was looking for the best way to stay in the industry. 
When exceptional values vanished in PCS, McCaw looked to alternatives. Although Nextel benefitted 
from higher PCS prices, McCaw did not, since the terms of the Nextel deal were negotiated after McCaw 
left the auction. 
  5.6 Strategic Bidding 
  The simultaneous multiple-round auction, by revealing information and giving bidders enormous 
flexibility in responding to information, tends to minimize the need for elaborate bidding strategies. 
Nonetheless, a simple strategy of bidding up licenses until price exceeds value is probably far from  
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optimal. Firms bidding in multiple markets have an incentive to under bid; that is, to bid in fewer markets 
than they desire at current prices (Ausubel and Cramton 1996, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1995). The 
bidders face a complex matching problem: who should get which licenses? They have a strong interest in 
resolving this question before prices get too high. The auction can be thought of as a negotiation process in 
which bidders begin by making conflicting demands. The auction ends when enough bidders reduce 
demands, so that excess demand is zero. Signaling is a device to facilitate the sorting. Signaling can take 
the form of public announcements, such as PacTel's repeated announcements that it would win Los 
Angeles and San Francisco, or it can be through bidding behavior. Code bidding, double bidding, jump 
bidding, raising one's own bid, and strategic drops or shifts in bids are all examples of strategic bidding. 
  Code bidding involves using the last few digits of a bid to signal information to a rival. For example, 
on markets of primary interest, GTE ended its bids with 483, which spells “GTE” on a telephone keypad. 
American Portable, a subsidiary of TDS, signaled interest in some markets by spelling “TDS” (837) in the 
last three digits. A more collusive use of a code bid is to tell the bumped rival where to move. A bid of 
$14,500,039 on Tulsa could tell the bumped bidder to move to market 39 (El Paso). Alternatively, the 
code bid can threaten the bumped bidder to drop out of the market or face retaliation in another market. If 
the firm bumped by a bid of $6,200,024 holds a high bid in market 24, the bidder may be telling the 
bumped firm, “Drop out of this market or expect punishment in market 24.” There was some use of code 
bidding in the MTA auction, but the codes were not as obviously collusive as the last two examples. Some 
bidding teams decided that such codes were too blatant and ran the risk of antitrust action by the Justice 
Department. 
  Double bidding — bidding on both licenses in a market — became a common strategy in stage 3. If 
the market is contested (there are three or more bidders active in the market) or prices are low, the double 
bid is a cheap way to maintain eligibility. It also facilitates tacit collusion by maintaining eligibility without 
moving into a rival's territory. PrimeCo made use of the double bid in the early rounds of stage 3. 
WirelessCo made extensive use of the double bid, preserving more than 20 million of eligibility through 
much of stage 3. 
  The double bidding let WirelessCo store eligibility for later use. This was important because it gave 
WirelessCo flexibility in deciding when to attack in certain markets. A good example was WirelessCo's 
behavior toward McCaw. WirelessCo patiently waited for McCaw to use waivers and drop eligibility 
before bumping McCaw in New York in round 70. In round 74, McCaw dropped out of New York, 
leaving WirelessCo as high bidder, but bumping WirelessCo in San Francisco in the process. However, 
McCaw could not return to New York unless it was bumped or withdrew in San Francisco. Hence, 
WirelessCo left McCaw alone in San Francisco. By round 87, McCaw had used all its waivers and 
dropped 18 million in eligibility, preventing a return to New York. WirelessCo immediately returned to 
San Francisco. 
  Double bidding can help a bidder postpone an attack in particular markets, but it is not without costs. 
Double bidding exposes the bidder to withdrawal penalties and it may increase prices in the markets with 
double bids. 8 of the 51 markets closed with a double bidder dropping one of its two bids. Hence, the 
double bidder often pushed price above what it would have been without the double bid. 
  Only well into stage 3 did we begin to see jump bidding.
11 WirelessCo placed four jump bids in round 
                                                                                                                                       
     
11Exceptions were the two jump bids in Los Angeles by McCaw, but these simply pushed the Los 
Angeles price back in line with other major markets. Southwestern Bell also placed some jump bids in 
stage 2.  
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79, double bidding in two uncontested markets (Pittsburgh and Kansas City). It did the same thing in two 
markets in round 81 (Des Moines and Oklahoma). These jumps were difficult to understand. They did 
suggest that prices were still low in several markets or else WirelessCo was throwing money away. 
WirelessCo must have expected further activity in these markets. Indeed, in three of the four markets, 
there was additional activity. Only in Oklahoma did WirelessCo face a withdrawal penalty as a result of 
the large double jumps. In two of the markets (Pittsburgh and Des Moines), it paid one bid increment less 
than the other winner. WirelessCo's double jumps were probably unsuccessful. The message they sent was 
confusing and led to significant overbidding in Oklahoma. 
  Although jump bids were rare, there were a few instances where markets closed after a jump bid. For 
example, PrimeCo's final bid in Chicago was a jump $11.7 million above the minimum bid. WirelessCo 
dropped out in response. It is impossible to know whether PrimeCo left money on the table or whether the 
jump induced WirelessCo to drop out. 
  Strategic shifts or drops can be used to facilitate collusion. In a strategic shift, a bidder shifts to 
another license to keep prices in other markets from escalating. If firms X and Y are competing in market 
1 and firm X is in market 2, then Y switches out of market 1 and into market 2, implicitly telling X to 
drop 2 to prevent further competition in market 1. In a strategic drop, a bidder drops a license, prompting 
a reciprocal drop from a competitor. If X and Y are competing in markets 1 and 2, then Y drops market 1, 
implicitly telling X to drop market 2. Strategic shifts and drops have two difficulties, which limit their use. 
First, the implicit message is much less clear than with a gift withdrawal or code bidding. Second, 
strategic shifts and drops are only effective once the competition is down to two bidders. Prices at this 
point may already be high. There is little evidence that strategic shifts or drops were used successfully to 
limit competition. 
  In special circumstances, raising one's own bid may be a good strategy. If the high bidder believes 
that the remaining competitor would be willing to bid up one bid increment, but not two, then the high 
bidder may benefit from raising its own bid. PrimeCo successfully anticipated GTE's final bid in 
Jacksonville. PrimeCo raised its own bid in round 108, topping GTE's final bid in the same round. A 
good example of the cost of such a strategy is Powertel's $2.5 million raise of its own bid in Jacksonville 
in round 110. Powertel expected GTE to come back in Jacksonville, but GTE had decided to drop the 
market. Another costly example is WirelessCo's experience in San Francisco. In round 97, WirelessCo, 
Alaacr, and American Portable were still competing for the remaining San Francisco license (it was 
assumed that PacTel would win the other). WirelessCo was the high bidder and had just made the gift 
withdrawals of Tampa and Houston to get American Portable to move off San Francisco. WirelessCo 
expected Alaacr and perhaps American Portable to come back in San Francisco. In anticipation of this 
competition, WirelessCo raised its own bid by $14.4 million. But the competition did not materialize. Both 
Alaacr and American Portable dropped out of San Francisco. 
  For the most part, bidders tended to bid on the cheaper of the two bands. However, in several cases 
this rule was not followed. There are two reasons for bidding on the more expensive license. First, the 
bidder may prefer one band over the other, because it expects to win neighboring licenses of the same 
band. AT&T attempted to get band A in most of its markets; PrimeCo favored band B. Second, it may 
make sense to bid against the weaker bidder to avoid punishment in other markets. A bid against the 
strong firm may upset tacit collusion and drive prices higher. In four markets, the final bid was on the 
more expensive license against a smaller (weaker) bidder. AT&T bumped PCS America in Buffalo rather 
than the slightly cheaper license held by WirelessCo. In Detroit, WirelessCo bumped American Portable, 
rather than AT&T although it was $1 million more. In Atlanta, AT&T bumped Powertel, not GTE 
although it was $4.3 million more. In Minneapolis, WirelessCo bumped Continental although it was $1.3  
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million more than American Portable. One possible explanation for this behavior is that the bidder was 
concerned with retaliation in other markets. Otherwise, bidding against the strong bidder is the better 
strategy. It saves money and raises the cost of a strong competitor. 
  Strategic bidding played a more important role in the MTA auction than in the narrowband auctions, 
because of the reduced competition. However, even in this auction, much of the strategic bidding did not 
seem to improve the bidder's position. Subtle signaling was especially ineffective. 
  5.7 Bid Withdrawals 
  Bid withdrawals are another example of strategic bidding. The purpose of allowing withdrawals is to 
let bidders back out of failed aggregations. There were 21 withdrawals in the auction. All but two were in 
stage 3. However, none of the withdrawals seems to be motivated by an exit from a failed aggregation. 
Rather the withdrawals appeared to be for some other strategic purpose. 
  There are several reasons for withdrawing a bid: 
•  To back out of a failed aggregation. The withdrawal follows being bumped on complementary 
licenses. The bidder either drops eligibility or shifts to another set of complementary licenses. 
•  To increase flexibility in the next round of bidding. A bidder with little free eligibility might want to 
shift among licenses in the next round. 
•  To maintain eligibility or raise rivals' costs. A bidder might engage in a fight for a license it is not 
truly interested in. It then withdraws when the competitor drops out. 
•  To maintain eligibility without raising prices. A bidder withdraws from a license and then places a 
minimum bid. When repeated, this maintains eligibility, but prices do not rise, so long as a 
competitor places the minimum bid. The withdrawal signals to others that the bidder is not truly 
interested in the license. 
•  To make room for another bidder to drop down. In a fight with another bidder, a bidder might 
withdraw to suggest that the competitor move to the withdrawn license rather than continue the fight. 
This facilitates tacit collusion by offering a gift and then lowering the cost of punishment. It is easier 
to punish bad behavior by the bidder that takes over a withdrawn license. A raise by the bidder that 
withdrew is essentially costless, since the withdrawn bid amount is already committed. 
  Table 6 shows the 21 bid withdrawals in the auction. WirelessCo made 11 of the 21 withdrawals. 
Only 6 withdrawals resulted in penalties. The $14.836 million in penalties were paid by WirelessCo 
($14.514 million) and American Portable ($0.322 million). Most of the withdrawals were to maintain 
eligibility (11 of 21) or increase flexibility (5 of 21). WirelessCo's extensive double bidding resulted in 
only two withdrawals (Minneapolis and Oklahoma) with penalties of $3.851 million. None of the 
withdrawals appeared to be caused by predatory bidding (bidding up a license to raise a rival's costs). 
  One pair of withdrawals was apparently intended as a gift to entice a competitor to shift to the 
withdrawn licenses. In round 97, WirelessCo withdrew from Tampa and Houston, hoping that American 
Portable would take this gift and move off San Francisco. American Portable accepted the gift, moving 
down to Tampa and Houston in the next round. WirelessCo's gift cost it $8.505 million in penalties, but 
this is less than one bid increment in San Francisco. 
  A possible implication of the withdrawals in stage 3 is that some licenses might go unsold. Late in 
stage 3, bidders might not have the eligibility to pick up withdrawn licenses. Fortunately this did not 
happen. Most of the withdrawals near the end of the auction were to increase flexibility in the next round.  
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If the licenses were not picked up by a competitor, then the withdrawing bidder picked up its own 
withdrawals. 
  6 The C-Block Auction 
  The next auction was for the third (and final) 30 MHz block of broadband spectrum, the C-block. 493 
BTA licenses were sold to small businesses (annual revenues less than $40 million). Large firms were not 
eligible to bid. Although this auction was to start shortly after the MTA auction finished, the auction was 
delayed for 6 months in the courts.
12 The C-block auction finally began on December 18, 1995, and 
concluded nearly 5 months later on May 6, 1996, after 184 rounds. Revenues net of the 25% bidding 
credit were $10.2 billion, more than double the prices in the MTA auction. 
  Figure 4 displays the bidding activity and revenue by round. Bidding activity was much higher than in 
the MTA auction — so much so that the stage transitions were hardly noticeable. Bidders did not hold 
back as they did in the MTA auction. Prices quickly escalated to well beyond MTA prices. Early activity 
was especially strong in the major markets.  This is consistent with the major markets (e.g., Chicago) 
being key to a synergistic combination in a broader area (the midwest). Bidders wanted to resolve the 
major markets before going after the smaller complementary markets. Bidding in the second half of the 
auction was almost exclusively on these smaller markets. 
  Many were shocked by the high prices. What accounted for average net prices of $39.88 per pop in 
the C-block, compared with $15.54 per pop in the MTA auction? There are two main explanations: 
installment payments and competition. 
  The small bidders in the C-block auction were given attractive payment terms to compensate for 
difficulties in raising capital. C-block winners pay 5% at the end of the auction, 5% at the time of award, 
and then ten years of installment payments at the 10-year Treasury note rate. The quarterly installments 
cover interest only for the first six years. During the auction the 10-year T-note rate was about 6.5%. If 
we assume a cost of capital for the firm of 14%, then this 7.5% spread amounts to an additional bidding 
credit of 32%. With a 16.5% cost of capital (10% spread), the installment payments give an additional 
bidding credit of 40%. Hence, the C-block price of $39.88 becomes .6⋅39.88 = $23.93. 
                                                                                                                                       
     
12On March 15, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia stayed the auction until 
the court could hear the case brought by Telephone Electronics Corporation (TEC), a rural telephone 
company. TEC claimed that it was unfairly excluded from the auction and questioned the constitutionality 
of bidder preferences for women and minorities. In early April, TEC withdrew its lawsuit in a settlement 
with a third-party. PCS PrimeCo, a major bidder in the MTA auction, agreed to give TEC what it wanted. 
The auction, which was scheduled to begin in June 1995, was postponed until early August. The auction 
was postponed again when the June 12 Supreme Court decision in Adarand v. Pena made it likely that the 
race and sex preferences would not survive a constitutional challenge. The FCC modified the rules to give 
all small businesses, regardless of race or sex, the same 25% price preference and attractive payment 
terms. Previously, only women or minority controlled firms were eligible for the most attractive terms. 
The auction was rescheduled to August 29. The C-block auction was stayed a third time on October 18, in 
response to Radiofone's challenge of the PCS/cellular cross-ownership rule, which limits the amount of 
broadband PCS spectrum that a cellular licensee can acquire in its cellular market. On October 25, Justice 
Stevens, Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, vacated the stay. On October 30, the full U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to overturn Justice Stevens' Order dissolving the Sixth Circuit stay.  
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  This calculation ignores the option value created by the back-loaded installment plan. To the extent 
that there is uncertainty about the value of spectrum, the option of default in case spectrum has a low value 
makes a license worth more than its expected value. Nonetheless, an effective bidding credit from 
installments in the range of 30 to 50 percent seems about right. At 40%, the installment payments account 
for about $16 of the $24 spread between the C and A-B prices. 
  The second important factor explaining the higher prices was the much greater competition in the C-
block. Competition in the MTA auction was weak in several of the major markets. In contrast, 
competition in the C-block auction was strong in all markets. The eligibility ratio (total eligibility in pops 
divided by total pops being auctioned) was 6.75, compared with 1.93 in the MTA auction. There were 255 
bidders compared to 30 in the MTA. 89 bidders won licenses, rather than 18 in the MTA. 
  Ausubel and Cramton (1996) demonstrate that larger bidders have a greater incentive to reduce 
demand in order to keep prices low. Hence, having a large number of small bidders is more competitive 
than a small number of large bidders, holding the eligibility ratio fixed. Moreover, competition may have 
been heightened by the fact that in many cases the bidders were startups that would be out of a job if 
licenses were not won. 
  The importance of competition in determining prices is seen by comparing prices in the four largest 
MTAs (Table 7). The C-block prices have been discounted by 40% to account for the installment 
payments. Notice that the C-block prices are fairly close. In contrast, the Chicago MTA price is well 
above the other MTA prices. In Chicago, all three nationwide bidders (WirelessCo, AT&T, and PrimeCo) 
were eligible to bid; whereas, in New York and San Francisco, only WirelessCo was eligible. This lack of 
competition in New York and San Francisco seems the only compelling explanation for the low prices in 
these markets, relative to Chicago. Judging from these markets, the discounted C-block prices are not out 
of line with the prices on the more competitive markets in the MTA auction. This conclusion is supported 
by the price regression in Ausubel, et al (1996). The strongest determinant of prices in the MTA auction 
was the level of competition, measured as the eligibility in the market over the total eligibility. In the C-
block auction this variable was insignificant, since all markets were competitive. 
 Table  7. Price Comparison in Major Markets ($ per person in 1994) 
 
Market 




New York  27.74  16.52 
Los Angeles  26.47  24.05 
Chicago 27.18  30.40 
San Francisco  31.54  16.10 
 
  The high C-block prices raised the concern that some winners may default. Indeed, the fourth largest 
winner (BDPCS) failed to make the initial 5% down payment, defaulting on 17 licenses for which it bid 
$874 million. BDPCS was expecting the down payment to come from US West, but apparently US West 
changed its mind about funding BDPCS. The FCC quickly decided to reauction the licenses. The reauction 
began on July 3 and ended on July 16 after 25 rounds. By the fifth day of bidding (round 16), net revenues 
of the reauctioned C-block licenses already matched the $874 million total from the default. On day six,  
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the auction was nearly over with two consecutive rounds with no new bids (the auction remained open, 
because at least one firm submitted a proactive waiver). Final net revenue was $905 million, 3% greater 
than in the initial auction. In all but four markets, the reauctioned licenses sold for within 25% of the 
original prices. 
  Aside from this default, which was quickly corrected, the auction was successful. There surely will 
be future defaults, given the large number of small businesses that won licenses. However, this must be 
expected in an auction involving such substantial sums and yet small upfront payments. 
  This auction demonstrated the feasibility of conducting simultaneous multiple-round auctions with 
hundreds of licenses and hundreds of bidders. Although the auction was long, the long duration gave 
bidders and capital markets time to make difficult decisions that determined the assignment. The speed of 
the reauction indicates the importance of price uncertainty in determining auction duration. 
  7 Auctioning Encumbered Licenses 
  Two other auctions were conducted at the same time as the C-block auction. The MDS (wireless 
cable) auction had the same structure as the C-block: a single license in each of 493 BTAs. In the SMR 
auction, 20 licenses were sold in each of 51 MTAs (1020 licenses in total). Both of these auctions involved 
the sale of heavily encumbered licenses. The FCC had previously awarded numerous MDS and SMR 
licenses of limited geographic scope. In these auctions, winners must protect incumbents against 
interference. Hence, what was sold was like swiss cheese with large holes in some of the most desirable 
areas. As a result, MTA and BTA populations were no longer a relevant measure of the size of a license. 
Instead, the FCC used "bidding units," which were an attempt to measure the size of the effective 
population covered by a license. 
  Both auctions attracted a large number of bidders (155 for MDS and 128 for SMR), but the initial 
eligibility ratios (3.6 for MDS and 2.4 for SMR) were well below that of the C-block. Figures 5 and 6 
show the bidding activity and revenue by round. The stage transitions are noticeable in both, suggesting a 
mild tendency for the bidders to hold back. However, neither had the large swings in activity found in the 
MTA auction. 
  The discontinuous jump in revenues in round 9 of the SMR auction was the result of a mistaken bid. 
Atlanta Trunking intended to bid $125,025, but added three extra zeros, and submitted the bid of 
$125,025,000. Atlanta Trunking immediately withdrew the bid, but according to the FCC rules was liable 
for a withdrawal penalty well in excess of $100 million. This was the first mistaken bid in FCC spectrum 
auctions, but not the last. Three mistaken bids were placed in the C-block auction. MAP added an extra 
zero to its bid in round 10. Then only two rounds later, PCS 2000 made the same mistake on a larger 
license. Finally, in round 38, Georgia Independent added an extra zero as well. Given that over 60,000 
bids were placed in these three auctions, it is not surprising that a few mistakes were made. The FCC 
responded to these mistaken bids by modifying the software to warn the bidder if a bid appears to be a 
mistake. In addition, they adopted a rule for mistaken bids. The rule limits the size of the penalty in the 
event of a mistaken bid, but still imposes a penalty sufficient to discourage mistakes. 
  In the SMR auction, the incumbents expressed concern that they might be at a disadvantage in the 
auction. They argued that they were vulnerable to speculators, to predatory bidding, and would have less 
flexibility in stage 3 to move to unencumbered licenses. I was of the opinion that incumbents were at an 
advantage. The incumbent would be buying areas that complement its existing licenses; whereas, the 
nonincumbent would be buying swiss cheese with substantial interference problems. As it turned out, 
incumbents paid significantly less than nonincumbents.  
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  8 Assessing the Auction Design 
  Since we do not observe the values firms place on licenses, it is impossible to directly assess the 
efficiency of these auctions. Nonetheless, we can indirectly evaluate the auction design from the observed 
behavior. To aid in comparing and assessing the auctions, Table 8 presents summary statistics for each 
auction. These statistics are discussed throughout this section. 
  8.1 Extensive Information was Revealed by the Bidding 
  Two essential features of the design are (1) the use of multiple rounds, rather than a single sealed bid, 
and (2) simultaneous, rather than sequential sales. The goal of both of these features is to reveal 
information and then give the bidders the flexibility to respond to the information. This should reduce the 
winner's curse and more importantly facilitate efficient aggregations. Proponents of sequential auctions 
have argued that the information revealed in a simultaneous auction is of little help to the bidders, because 
it is only preliminary information. The final outcome may be far from the current state, even near the 
auction's end. Using the data from the auctions, I evaluate both the quality of the information revealed in 
the auction and the ability of firms to respond to the information. There are two dimensions to the 
information: the assignment of licenses and the prices of the licenses. Each is considered in turn. 
  As observed earlier, the upfront payment is an excellent indicator of the quantity of spectrum won. It, 
however, tells us nothing about which licenses a firm will win. For this bidders must look at the bids 
during the auction. In each of the auctions, much about the final assignment was determined well before 
the auction's end. 
  In the nationwide auction, the high bidders in round 28 were the same as in the final assignment 19 
rounds later, except for one license. Only a few questions remained, such as which firms would get the 
two 50s. Well before round 28, it was clear who was likely to win the 50/50s and 50/12s. The assignment 
in the regional auction settled even more quickly. By round 10, the high bidders were the same as in the 
final assignment 95 rounds later. 
  One might expect that the MTA auction would present a different picture, because of the rampant 
under bidding in stages 1 and 2 of the auction. However, despite this under bidding, the current 
assignment revealed a great deal of information about the final assignment. Figure 7 tracks by round the 
fraction of current high bidders (pop weighted) that eventually win in their current markets. This fraction, 
which hits 50% in the second round, gradually increases throughout the auction. At the end of stage 2 
(round 64), 76% of the current high bidders were still high at the end of the auction (round 112). The 
major exceptions were in New York, Chicago, and Washington. 
  The clarity of the assignments stems from the fact that most bidders had focused interests. They bid 
on a relatively small set of licenses throughout the auction, although they were typically eligible to bid on 
much more. As a result, the number of active bidders in each market was small. Table 9 shows the 
distribution of the number of excess bidders in each market. It is based on the number of bidders that were 
active in the market after stage 2. A typical market had 3 excess bidders (5 bidders in total) over the entire 
auction. By the end of stage 2, there was only a single excess bidder in a typical market.  
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 Table  9. Distribution of Excess Bidders in Markets (Population Weighted) 
Number of excess bidders in market  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Percent of markets over entire auction  0  13  20  41  20  6 
Percent of markets after stage 2  15  42  30  11  1  0 
 
  The current bids provide good information about final assignments, but what about prices? Again, in 
all six auctions, current prices give good information about relative prices at end of auction. Figure 8 
displays the correlation between current and final prices throughout the MTA auction. Initial bids are only 
modestly correlated with final prices (30%). This correlation does not increase until stage 2, but then 
increases sharply in the early rounds of stage 2, reaching 62% by round 21. From round 21, the 
correlation increases steadily throughout the remainder of the auction. The correlation is 83% at the end of 
stage 2. 
  The remaining question is whether bidders have the flexibility to act on the information. By the time 
firms have a good sense about prices and the assignment, they may not have sufficient eligibility to 
respond. Clearly this was not the case in the narrowband auctions. In the nationwide auction, firms 
maintained their full eligibility throughout the auction, since the auction never moved out of stage 1. In the 
regional auction, the assignment and prices settled early. Bidders had good information about the outcome 
throughout stage 2 and had plenty of flexibility to shift among licenses. 
  The biggest concern about flexibility came in the MTA auction, where much of the action did not 
occur until stage 3. Figure 9 shows the eligibility ratio by round. Starting at 1.93, the eligibility ratio fell 
to 1.53 by the end of stage 2. Hence, at the end of stage 2, there is good information about prices (83% 
correlation with final prices) and assignments (76% eventually win), and yet plenty of eligibility (1.53) to 
shift among licenses in response to this information. This flexibility was observed in the firms' behavior 
through most of stage 3. Firms bidding on several licenses were able to move among different sets of 
licenses, only losing an insignificant amount of eligibility. American Portable and others made such shifts 
in several rounds. The fact that there was much movement among licenses as prices changed suggests that 
the simultaneous design was important in determining the outcome. 
  The extensive information about prices and assignments is not simply a result of markets closing 
early. Figure 10 shows the fraction of licenses by round with final bids (pop weighted). At the end of stage 
2 only 19% of the licenses had received final bids. By round 74, the correlation between current and final 
prices was up to 89%, even though final bids had been received on only 25% of the licenses. A great deal 
of bidding was still to take place, but the information about the eventual outcome was excellent. 
  8.2 Similar Items Sold for Similar Prices 
  An advantage of the simultaneous ascending-bid design is that it tends to generate market prices. 
Similar items should sell for similar prices. There is strong evidence of this in all six auctions. In the 
nationwide auction, the price differences among similar licenses were at most a few percent and often 
zero. In the regional auction, price differences were larger, but still small with the exception of one license 
with a bid withdrawal late in stage 3. The importance of forming nationwide aggregations within the same 
band was probably the source of the larger differences in prices. In the MTA auction, only the A and B 
licenses within the same market are directly comparable. A and B prices differed by less than one bid 
increment in 42 of the 48 markets. In the six markets where prices differed by more than an increment,  
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three involved withdrawals (two to maintain eligibility and one gift) and three were to avoid strong 
bidders, which was especially important if the strong bidder favors one band. 
  The generation of market prices is important from an efficiency viewpoint. In addition, it contributes 
to a sense among the bidders (and observers) that the auction is fair. Most bidders in all six auctions 
walked away feeling satisfied by the process, even if they were disappointed by the outcome. 
  The simultaneous stopping rule is an important factor in achieving market prices and efficiency. 
Market-by-market closing would not give the bidders sufficient flexibility. With market-by-market closing, 
the auction is essentially a sequential auction with endogenous order. A license may close by the time a 
bidder wants to shift to it. This possibility was seen in each of the auctions. It was common for licenses to 
have no bids for several rounds followed by steep increases in price. For example, in the nationwide 
auction, bids on the 50/50s stopped for seven rounds (from round 20 to 26) at $70 million, but then 
increased to $80 million. Prices on the 50/12s had to increase before bidding could continue on the 50/50s. 
This tendency for long pauses in activity in particular markets was even more pronounced in the MTA 
auction. 
  8.3 Efficient Aggregations were Formed 
  Valuations depend on the set of licenses won. Hence, it is important to use an auction form that 
allows bidders to express these value interdependencies. Such a design would encourage the formation of 
efficient aggregations. Supporters of the simultaneous ascending-bid design argued that bidders would have 
sufficient flexibility to express valuations for combinations of licenses, even without package bids. 
However, others argued that package bids would be essential to achieving efficiency. They feared the 
exposure problem would discourage bidders from going after synergistic gains. Evidence from the 
auctions suggests that bidders were able to form efficient aggregations without package bids. 
  In the nationwide auction, the aggregation problem was simple. Bidders acquiring multiple bands 
preferred adjacent bands. In all cases, bidders acquiring multiple bands were successful in winning 
adjacent bands (PageNet won bands 1 and 2, and McCaw won bands 3 and 4). 
  In the regional auction, the aggregation problem was more complicated. Several bidders had 
nationwide interests. These bidders would have to aggregate all five regions, preferably all in the same 
band. The bidders were remarkably successful in achieving these aggregations. Four of the six bands sold 
as nationwide aggregations. Bidders were able to win all five regions within the same band. Even in the 
two bands that were not sold as nationwide aggregations, bidders winning multiple licenses won 
geographically adjacent licenses within the same band. The regional auction demonstrated that in this 
setting it is possible to build large aggregations without allowing package bids. 
  Large aggregations also were formed in the MTA auction. Overall, there was a tendency for bidders 
to win the same band when acquiring adjacent licenses. AT&T was high bidder on the A band in its top 
markets and PrimeCo was the high bidder on the B band in its top markets. The large aggregations won by 
WirelessCo, AT&T, and PrimeCo appear to have efficient geographic coverage when one includes cellular 
holdings. WirelessCo won nationwide coverage except for a single strip of licenses from Cleveland to 
Tampa and a few other holes (most notably Chicago). PrimeCo won nationwide coverage except for a 
single block of licenses in the central U.S. Likewise, AT&T was able to fill its cellular holes except for 
three regions. The absence of package bids did not seem to prevent firms from forming efficient 
aggregations. However, it is certainly possible that efficiency was reduced, because of under bidding. 
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  Further evidence of efficient aggregations comes from the absence of bid withdrawals. There were no 
withdrawals in the nationwide auction. The two withdrawals in the regional auction were minor. They 
were caused by strategic bidding unrelated to a bidder backing out of a failed aggregation. 
  Withdrawals in the MTA auction did not suggest aggregation failures. The withdrawals through stage 
2 were of no importance. There was an increase in withdrawals in stage 3, but they were mostly motivated 
from efforts to maintain eligibility, rather than by aggregation failures. A few were attempts to end 
competition in other markets. If successful, such attempts might reduce efficiency, but they only succeeded 
in one case. No withdrawals were to back out of failed aggregations. Exposure, then, did not seem to be a 
problem preventing efficient aggregations. 
  The C-block auction had 50 withdrawals out of nearly 30,000 bids. Most of these occurred early in 
the auction. Intouch, for example, made 12 withdrawals in the first 10 rounds, apparently for some 
signaling purpose. There were no withdrawals in the last 55 rounds of bidding. 
  Certainly there are settings in which the exposure problem is severe and efficiency is destroyed by not 
allowing package bids. Experimental evidence is given in Bykowsky, et al. (1995). These tend to be 
settings with extreme synergies, where a missing piece makes the collection worthless. Real estate projects 
and room on the space shuttle have this character. However, the synergies in PCS licenses are much less 
severe. MTA licenses are sufficiently large to capture much of the regional synergies. There is some 
benefit to having adjacent licenses and there may be other marketing or network synergies, but they are 
not 0-1. Those favoring package bids may have overestimated the extent of the exposure problem. 
  Ausubel, et al. (1996) analyze the MTA auction data to see if there is evidence that synergies caused 
bidders to pay more for adjacent licenses. They find no such evidence, which suggests that the exposure 
problem probably did not hamper the formation of efficient aggregations. 
  8.4 Tacit Collusion was Limited 
  The simultaneous multiple-round auction gives bidders a great deal of information and provides 
enormous flexibility in responding to this information. In a competitive auction, this information and 
flexibility should improve efficiency, but it also opens to the door to more collusive strategies. Is there any 
evidence of collusion in the early PCS auctions? There are two main concerns: limiting competition 
through alliances, followed by tacit collusion during the auction. 
  There was no evidence of collusion in either the nationwide or regional auctions. Alliances were 
unimportant in the nationwide auction. The successful firms bid on their own. In the regional auction, 
alliances were formed between designated entities and established paging companies. The alliances 
transformed weak bidders into strong companies capable of competing with the industry leaders. Bidding 
was aggressive and competitive throughout both narrowband auctions. Marginal bidders dropped out only 
after long fights with the eventual winners. Jump bidding, although pervasive, seemed ineffective at 
steering competitors to other licenses. Prices were higher than many predicted. Even when excess demand 
was small, bidders were unwilling to scale-back demands in order to close the auction at substantially 
lower prices. 
  Collusion was much more of an issue in the MTA auction. The PrimeCo alliance presented the 
biggest problem. It transformed four deep-pocketed bidders with extensive market eligibility into one 
deep-pocketed bidder with limited market eligibility. It created the possibility of slight competition in some 
major markets, such as New York and Los Angeles, and reduced competition in other markets. In 
contrast, the WirelessCo alliance probably increased competition by creating a strong nationwide bidder 
from companies that would have been much weaker on their own.  
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  The PrimeCo alliance greatly increased the chances of successful tacit collusion. This is the primary 
explanation for the rampant under bidding in the early stages of the MTA auction. Given the possibility 
that the matching could occur at low prices, there was no incentive for firms to bid aggressively. The low 
activity requirement in stages 1 and 2 meant that bidders could bid well under their true demands and yet 
preserve most or all of their eligibility. As such, firms tended to limit their bids to what they wanted most. 
  Fortunately, tacit collusion is easily upset. It requires that all the bidders reach an implicit agreement 
about who should get what. With thirty diverse bidders unable to communicate about strategy except 
through their bids, forming such a unanimous agreement is difficult at best. Although some bidders had 
clear interests in a few licenses, other bidders like Alaacr and American Portable simply were looking for 
value. These value-seeking bidders can have large demands at low prices and are hard to punish. In 
addition, the nationwide goals of WirelessCo, AT&T, and PrimeCo were incompatible. Not all three 
could succeed in forming a nationwide aggregation. How much should each cut back to allow room for the 
other two, as well as the smaller bidders? Disagreements were bound to arise and these disagreements 
would limit tacit collusion. 
  Fears of collusion peaked in round 10 of stage 1 when bidding activity plunged to just a single bid in 
Detroit despite bargain prices. But with the onset of stage 2, bidding activity jumped back up and remained 
strong. Bidders refused to cut eligibility until well into stage 2. Sorting out who should get what was not 
going to be accomplished without the price mechanism. Nonetheless, it was clear that stage 3 would be 
needed to push prices up. By round 60, activity had once again dropped below 10%. Many bidders could 
maintain eligibility in stage 2 by simply sitting on their high bids. 
  Strong bidding early in stage 3, especially by WirelessCo and AT&T, put fears of tacit collusion to 
rest. These firms needed to cut eligibility significantly for the auction to close and neither expressed any 
interest in doing so. The auction did not end until the average price surpassed government estimates. In a 
1992 study, the Congressional Budget Office estimated prices to be between $3.50 and $15.00 per pop. In 
1994, the Office of Management and Budget estimated a price of $12.47 per pop compared with the actual 
average price of $15.54 per pop. Estimates based on recent cellular transactions would be much higher, 
but it is difficult to unbundle the license value from the value of the network and existing customers. 
  Narrowband prices ($3.10 per MHz-pop in the nationwide auction and $3.46 in the regional auction) 
were about six times higher than broadband prices ($.52 per MHz-pop). However, this is not evidence of 
collusion in the MTA auction. The narrowband and broadband prices are not comparable, since it would 
be difficult to use broadband spectrum for narrowband applications. The imbalance simply reflects the 
different supply and demand conditions in the two markets. It does suggest that the FCC should go ahead 
with its plans to allocate more narrowband spectrum. 
  Although tacit collusion failed overall, there may have been some markets where bidders dropped out 
early to improve the outcome in other markets. For example, American Portable decided to drop out of 
San Francisco in response to WirelessCo's withdrawal in Tampa and Houston. However, WirelessCo 
raised its own bid in San Francisco in the round that American Portable dropped down to Tampa and 
Houston, so this “tacit collusion” was far from perfect. In addition, WirelessCo rebid in Houston later in 
the auction, bumping American Portable. After a careful review of the bidding, I was unable to find any 
clear cases of successful tacit collusion. 
  In those markets that appear to be especially good values (New York, Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco come to mind), the critical feature seems to be an absence of deep-pocketed bidders. My 
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  The auction outcome might have been radically different without the value-seeking bidders, especially 
Craig McCaw and American Portable. There was close to too little competition in the MTA auction. It is 
in precisely such circumstances that the simultaneous multiple-round auction is most vulnerable to 
collusion. In future auctions, it may make sense to reduce collusion risk by limiting alliances among major 
players in the industry. Such restrictions are common. For example, the top oil companies are not allowed 
to partner in oil lease auctions. However, it is not at all clear what rule the FCC could have adopted to 
prevent the PrimeCo alliance and yet encourage synergistic alliances. Formulating general rules would be 
complex if not impossible. Preventing such alliances on a case-by-case basis would likely delay the 
auctions and lead to litigation. 
  8.5 The Auction Durations were Reasonable 
  An important advantage of auctions is their ability to quickly assign licenses to high value uses. The 
sooner licenses are assigned, the sooner companies can provide services demanded by consumers. Hence, 
in judging the auction design, we must consider how long it takes to conduct the auction. 
  Certainly the narrowband auctions were concluded in a timely manner. The nationwide auction took 
one week and the regional auction concluded in two weeks. Other auction designs could assign the licenses 
more quickly, but given the importance of the licenses to the firms involved, a more hasty process would 
be foolish. Companies needed time to think through their options. The short auction durations were 
possible in these auctions, because of the small number of licenses up for auction (10 in the nationwide 
and 30 in the regional) and the relatively low stakes. This meant that many rounds could be conducted in a 
day. Toward the end of the auctions, when bidding activity was low and few decisions were being made, 
more than one round occurred each hour. 
  The MTA broadband auction concluded after about three months. This may seem like a long time, 
but given the magnitude of the decisions involved three months is a modest duration. The speed of the 
auction was limited by the large number of licenses (99) and the very high stakes. The auction can only go 
as fast as the bidder that needs the most time. WirelessCo's bidding was especially complex, because of 
the large number of licenses it was interested in. WirelessCo urged the FCC not to do more than two 
rounds per day. It was hard not to listen to WirelessCo's plea, since it was the largest bidder and had a 
legitimate concern. 
  Probably the largest cost of the three month duration is in postponing subsequent auctions. The 
remaining broadband auctions cannot begin until after the MTA auction. Companies need to know the 
MTA outcome before forming alliances and attracting investors. However, the cost associated with a three 
month delay is probably minimal. Companies also need time to develop plans and get capital in line. 
  The final three auctions, with many more bidders and licenses, took about four months, 180 rounds, 
and 80 days to complete. All three auctions had long final tails that involved few bids and little change in 
revenue or assignment. The FCC did well to shorten this tail by conducting many rounds per day. By the 
end, 8 or more rounds per day were held in each auction. 
  Certainly compared with prior methods of assignment the auctions have been successful. Even with 
streamlined comparative hearings, it took the FCC an average of two years to award thirty “non-wireline” 
cellular licenses (licenses not limited to local telephone companies). After the FCC switched to lotteries in 
cellular service, the average time to award a non-wireline license decreased to about one year. With 
auctions, the average time to award licenses has been less than a year. Of the ten nationwide narrowband 
PCS licenses, seven were awarded in under two months and the remaining three in under five months. The 
thirty regional narrowband PCS licenses were awarded in approximately three months. The 99 MTA  
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broadband PCS licenses took three months and the licenses were awarded in four months from the close of 
the auction. It should be noted that the length of an auction depends in part on policy decisions and that 
faster is not always better. In the case of the MTA broadband auction, most of the auction was conducted 
with two rounds per day so that bidders would have sufficient time to evaluate the results of the previous 
round and plan their bidding strategy. 
  8.6 Minimum Bid Increments were Needed 
  Minimum bid increments play an important role in controlling the pace of the auction. If set too high, 
the increments choke off bidding, even when the high bidder does not have the highest value. If set too 
low, the auction may last too many rounds if bidders bid at the minimum level. Large increments are 
especially useful early in the auction when activity is high and prices are low. There is little cost to large 
increments early in the auction. Large increments are inefficient only when they prevent the highest valuer 
from placing a bid. But if prices are low, the highest valuer can easily top the high bid by the minimum 
increment. Inefficiencies only appear when a license is about to close and the size of the inefficiency is at 
most one bid increment. (Markets do not literally close license-by-license. Individual licenses “close” in 
the sense that there are no further bids in the market.) Thus, the auctioneer can start with a large increment 
and then reduce the increment as the probability of closure increases. In the nationwide auction, where all 
of the licenses were good substitutes, overall bid activity was an excellent measure of when licenses were 
about to close, so a sensible rule tied the bid increment to bid activity. 
  In the MTA auction, licenses in different markets are not good substitutes and there is much greater 
variation in prices across markets. The FCC had no way to know when markets were likely to close. Also 
with so many licenses, it made sense to have a single rule for setting increments across all licenses. In the 
standard rule, the minimum increment is the greater of a percentage increment or a per-pop increment. 
Initially, the percentage increment was 5% and the per-pop increment was $.60 per pop (or $.02 per 
MHz-pop). In this case, until the price reaches $12 per pop, the per-pop increment would bind. Before a 
license receives a bid, the minimum increment is 0. This prevents licenses worth less than $.60 per pop 
from going unsold. 
  Early in stage 2, bidders continued to bid at the minimum level, but eligibility did not drop. Hence, to 
speed the auction along, the percentage increment was doubled to 10% in round 31. By round 31, the 10% 
increment was greater than the per pop increment in many important markets. The fact that the percentage 
increment was 5% at the beginning of the auction was largely irrelevant, since early in the auction it is the 
per pop increment that is binding. The per-pop increment remained $.60 per pop. The rationale for leaving 
the per-pop increment fixed was that several of the low-priced licenses might be near closure and this 
would reduce any inefficiencies on these licenses. 
  At the end of stage 2, the percentage increment had been cut back to 5%. When stage 3 began with 
the same strong activity seen in the beginning of stage 2, the FCC considered whether to raise the 
percentage increment to 10% again. This option was rejected and with good reason. In stage 3, activity 
drops as bidders reduce eligibility by permanently dropping out of markets. It is precisely at this point — 
the point when reservation prices are reached — that a modest bid increment is desired. Markets closed 
throughout the remainder of stage 3. This is seen in Figure 10, which shows the fraction of licenses (pop 
weighted) with final bids by round. Licenses did not begin to close until midway through stage 2 (about 
round 36). By the end of stage 2 (round 64) only 19% of the licenses had received their final bids. The 
remaining 81% of the licenses closed throughout stage 3 at a rapid and steady pace. Hence it was 
important to keep the bid increment low throughout stage 3.  
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  Based on similar reasoning, there is little point in dropping the bid increment late in stage 3. Toward 
the end of the auction, the vast majority of markets have already effectively closed and there is no way for 
a bidder to return to a market to take advantage of a lower increment. The lower increment then is only 
effective in the few markets that have yet to close. Since there is no way to predict when reservation prices 
may be reached in these markets, dropping the increment to 2% might greatly extend the auction (as was 
the case in the regional auction). The efficiency and revenue gain is likely small, since the low increment 
only applies to the few markets that have yet to close. Hence, it made sense to keep the increment at 5% 
throughout stage 3. 
  In retrospect, the MTA auction could have been sped up without much efficiency loss by adopting 
larger bid increments in the early rounds. Increments of 10% or $1.20 per pop in the first thirty rounds 
would have shortened the auction by more than a week. These adjustments were made for the final three 
auctions. 
  In future auctions, the FCC plans to further quicken the pace by using even larger bid increments 
early on. A difficulty with large increments is that some licenses may be close to final prices when others 
are far from final prices. To avoid this problem, the FCC plans to use license specific increments, where 
activity is used as an indicator that the license is far from the final price and a larger increment is in order. 
In the C-block it was not uncommon for some licenses to have no new bids and for others to have a dozen. 
  8.7 The Activity Rule Worked Well 
  One potential problem with the MTA broadband auction was the fact that prices and assignments 
shifted substantially in stage 3. Ideally, most of the action would take place in stage 1 and stage 2, when 
the less restrictive activity requirements were in place. Bidders in the early stages have great flexibility in 
shifting among licenses. In stage 3, flexibility is curtailed, increasing the possibility of inefficient 
assignments. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, the stringent stage 3 activity requirement did not pose a major obstacle to large 
bidders. Bidders were able to maintain eligibility through double bidding. Even without the double bid, 
firms bidding on several licenses were able to move among different sets of licenses, only losing an 
insignificant amount of eligibility. However, stage 3 does distort behavior. In each round, firms placed 
strategic bids to maintain eligibility and withdrawals were more common. Nonetheless, it does not appear 
that this strategic bidding severely reduced efficiency. 
  In stage 3, it is possible for the auction to effectively become a sequence of auctions from largest 
market to smallest as bidders drop down to smaller licenses. Bidders may not have the flexibility to make 
more sophisticated shifts. This hypothesis can be tested by looking at the time of final bids by license 
during stage 3. There was a slight tendency for larger licenses to close earlier. However, the association is 
weaker when one restricts attention to stage 3. Both the bidding behavior and the time of closure by 
license suggest that bidders had much more flexibility in stage 3 than in a sequence of auctions from 
largest to smallest. 
  The problems of a long stage 3 in the MTA auction were reduced in the last three auctions by 
adjusting the activity rule. In the C-block, the required activity in stage 1 was increased from 33% to 60% 
and the activity in stage 2 from 67% to 80%. This forces more of the sorting to occur in stages 1 and 2, 
and yet still give the bidders substantial flexibility in these early stages. In addition, the FCC reduced the 
stage 3 activity requirement from 100% to 95%, increasing flexibility in stage 3. Similar, activity 
requirements were used in the MDS and SMR auctions. 
  A further problem with a low activity requirement is that it can increase the possibility of successful  
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tacit collusion. With an activity requirement of 1/3, bidders can make modest demands without incurring 
the cost of a loss in eligibility. Unilateral cooperative reductions in demand are possible without losing the 
ability to punish if reciprocal reductions are not made by others. With a 100% activity requirement, 
modest demands are only possible with a loss of eligibility. 
 9  Conclusion 
  The FCC made a bold decision in settling on the simultaneous multiple-round auction to award the 
PCS licenses. Although this auction form had theoretical virtues, it was unproven. The easy decision 
would have been to adopt a traditional design, such as a sequential oral auction. Instead, the FCC chose to 
innovate. After careful study, the FCC began testing and fine-tuning the design with the auction of 
nationwide and regional narrowband licenses. These first two auctions proved remarkably successful. The 
theoretical virtues of the design became practical realities. Bidders moved easily among license 
combinations as prices adjusted. This movement was unhampered by activity requirements in the 
nationwide auction and only slightly constrained in the regional auction. There was a strong tendency for 
prices of similar licenses to sell for similar prices. Finally, the license assignments satisfied technical 
efficiency. When bidders won multiple bands, the bands were adjacent; when bidders won multiple 
regions, the regions were adjacent and on the same band. 
  Armed with these early successes, the FCC pushed forward with the MTA broadband PCS auction, 
the largest auction ever. Although this auction did not share the early aggressive behavior seen in the 
narrowband auctions, revenues increased steadily throughout the auction. Despite a restrictive activity 
requirement in the final stage, bidders managed to shift among licenses in response to price changes and 
build sensible aggregations. Competition heated up in the final stage, suggesting that the auction did 
identify an efficient allocation through escalating prices. Nonetheless, because of bidder alliances, 
competition was limited in several markets. Future auctions may benefit from restricting alliances among 
major firms. 
  The C-block, MDS, and SMR auctions demonstrated the feasibility of the simultaneous multiple-
round auction even with hundreds of bidders and licenses. These auctions required about 80 days of 
bidding — a relatively short period to determine an assignment of this complexity. 
  The success of these auctions does not imply that alternative designs would be less successful or that 
success is assured in future auctions. Although the early evidence is encouraging, there is still much to 
learn about auctions in this complex setting. One thing is certain: the assignment of licenses by auction is a 
huge improvement over allocation by lottery or comparative hearings. Market competition is putting the 
licenses in the hands of those companies best able to use them. Firms, consumers, and taxpayers all 
benefit. 
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